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Article

Beyond Liability:
Rewarding Effective Gatekeepers
Lawrence A. Cunningham*
Corporate and securities law scholars increasingly investigate the role of rewards
to promote desired behavior.1 Scholars have contributed considerable analysis to the
utility of positive incentives for corporate whistleblowers;2 a growing body of literature
addresses paying rewards to effective capital market gatekeepers, with attention given to
outside directors3 and lawyers.4 Previous literature on gatekeepers concentrated on
designing a liability system to achieve optimal deterrence while relying largely on
gatekeeper reputation as a self-enforcement device.5 This Article reviews the previous
literature, noting inherent limitations of reputation and liability threats, including how the
latter discourage gatekeepers from performing desirable services such as fraud detection.
It then begins to explore how a rewards program might be designed to overcome some of
those limitations and improve gatekeeper effectiveness.
*

Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. Thanks to John Coffee, Melvin
Eisenberg, Claire Hill, Alan Palmiter and other participants in Columbia University Law School’s
conference, “Gatekeepers Today: The Professions after the Reforms” (Sept. 29, 2006), where I presented
an early version of this Article, and to Assaf Hamdani.
1

See Tamar Frankel, Using the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to Reward Honest Corporations, 62 BUS. LAW. 161,
171-73 & 189-91 (2006) (offering “honest corporations” exemptions from certain provisions of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
2

See, e.g., Pamela H. Bucy, “Carrots and Sticks:” Post-Enron Regulatory Initiatives, 8 BUFF. L. CRIM. L.
REV. 277 (2004); Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model to Encourage Corporate
Whistleblowers, 2006 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1107; Geoffrey Christopher Papps, Beyond Protection: Invigorating
Incentives for Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate and Securities Fraud Whistleblowers, 87 BU L. REV. 91 (2007);
David L. Schwarzkopf & Hugh M. Miller, Early Evidence of How Sarbanes-Oxley Implementation Affects
Individuals and their Workplace Relationships, 110 BUS. & SOC’Y REV. 21 (2005).
3

See Assaf Hamdani & Reineir Kraakman, Rewarding Outside Directors, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1677, 169193 & 1703-07 (2007) (proposing a hypothetical reverse negligence regime in which directors can sue to
recover rewards following a triggering event, such as mis-reporting, by proving that they were nonnegligent in performing their duties or otherwise exceeded designated standards and also suggesting two
more modest alternatives that reward directors who resign in certain circumstances and authorize board
“leadership awards” to pay bonuses to outside directors for taking designated actions).

4

See David McGowan, Why Not Try the Carrot? A Modest Proposal for Granting Immunity to Lawyers
Who Disclose Client Financial Misconduct, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1825, 1837-38 & 1840 (2004) (offering
transactional immunity to securities lawyers who first report violations of law to authorities).
5

The seminal contributions to the theory of capital market gatekeeping are Reinier H. Kraakman,
Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857 (1984) [hereinafter,
Kraakman, Corporate Liability] and Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party
Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53 (1986) [hereinafter, Kraakman, Gatekeepers]. The ensuring
discussion discusses additional contributions to this literature.

The expanding interest in positive incentives for capital market gatekeepers
dovetails with a broader and older trend in the regulation literature. This reflects a
philosophical shift away from traditional deterrence-oriented strategies toward more
cooperative and rewards-oriented systems to promote compliance.6 This approach joins
market and regulatory accountability mechanisms that are described using various terms
such as cooperative compliance, interactive compliance, responsive regulation,
collaborative governance and cooperative implementation.7 An important inspiration for
this shift is empirical psychological evidence suggesting that positive incentives may be
more likely to promote desired behavior than negative threats.8
This Article considers the context of financial reporting in connection with
securities transactions. Complex forces of social norms and legal culture shape the
character of financial reports. Forces operate at both the enterprise level and among third
parties that enterprises enlist to assist in preparing disclosure, such as accountants and
lawyers. While law can influence financial reporting quality through negative threats or
positive incentives, lawyers and legal scholars focus nearly entirely on negative threats,
designing liability regimes to induce fair reporting. Law imposes duties on enterprises,
individuals, outside accounting and law firms and their individual professional
employees. The liability risks backing these regimes can be criminal or civil and include
money damages, prison terms, fines, license revocations and the like. Layers of liability
analysis result.
Yet law never supplies positive inducements (even lighter sanctions for
conscientious enterprises or gatekeepers are weaker sticks, not carrots). True, traditional
analysis also emphasizes reputation but mainly because gatekeepers put it at risk when
attesting to the veracity of an enterprise’s assertions, meaning this likewise operates more
as a stick than as a carrot. One consequence of the existing regime’s emphasis on
liability threats is to generate impressive professional resistance to undertaking a variety
of potentially useful functions. For example, the auditing profession has long resisted
any undertaking to detect for fraud in financial audits and the legal profession has long
resisted any undertaking to conduct due diligence exercises in preparing public offerings
of securities.

6

See, e.g., IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING
DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992).

THE

7

E.g., STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982); JAY A. SIGLER & JOSEPH E. MURPHY.
INTERACTIVE CORPORATE COMPLIANCE (1988); see Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the
Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487 (2003).
8

See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION, supra note 6, at 49–50 (“[P]sychological theories
of minimal sufficiency and positive attribution demonstrate that long-term internalization of a commitment
to compliance is more likely to occur when triggered by positive incentives rather than punishment”); see
generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW passum (1990).

2

The prevailing regime’s overwhelming emphasis on sticks offers limited
assurance of success. That system failed during the late 1990s and early 2000s. Yet
reforms concentrate on reconfiguring the type and combination of sticks in use. For
example, many emphasize the reduced threat of auditor liability during that period and
respond by prescribing enhanced penalties.9 Others point to factors that reduce auditor
investment in reputation, such as industry concentration,10 differences between partner
incentives and firm-level incentives,11 and the proliferation of non-audit services.12
Law’s preoccupation with liability design is understandable since lawyers have a
comparative advantage in liability design. Designing reward systems may seem beyond
law’s scope or lawyers’ competence. A lawyer might expect that if rewards programs are
productive, then market participants would design and implement them. While this
seems correct, two qualifications are relevant. First, non-market impediments can
frustrate implementing good ideas, as where gatekeepers fear that demonstrating the
capability to perform a task will expose them to liability. Second, contemporary financial
reporting occurs in a complex setting that combines free market innovation with
considerable regulatory limitations. The combination may prevent otherwise appealing
contractual innovations from gaining traction. If so, lawyers—and legal scholars—may
have capacity to spark ideas that markets can test and implement. It is in that spirit that
this Article introduces the possibility of going beyond liability to design rewards for
effective gatekeepers.
Part I reviews the theory of capital market gatekeeping. It presents the conceptual
underpinnings of the model and how a combination of reputation and liability risks
sustains it. Part II analyzes recent experience that shows limitations on the theory in
practice, including limitations that continue despite various reforms. From this fairly
9

See, e.g., JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE ROLE OF THE PROFESSIONS IN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 14–21 (2006); William W. Bratton, Jr., Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76
TUL. L. REV. 1275, 1350 (2002); William W. Bratton, Jr., Shareholder Value and Auditor Independence, 53
DUKE L.J. 439, 470 (2003); John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers,
Stupid”, 57 BUS. LAW. 1403, 1403–05, 1409–10 (2002).
10

See, e.g., U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Pub. No. GAO-03-864, Public Accounting Firms: Mandated
Study on Consolidation and Competition 16, 20–22 (2003), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03864.pdf;
Sean M. O’Connor, Be Careful What you Wish For: How Accountants and Congress Created the Problem
of Auditor Independence, 45 B.C. L. REV 741, 787–88 (2004); Robert A. Prentice, The Inevitability of a
Strong SEC, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 775, 786 (2006). See infra text accompanying notes 113–116.
11

See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure, and Enron, 89 CORNELL
L. REV. 394, 407–08 (2004); Richard W. Painter, Convergence and Competition in Rules Governing
Lawyers and Auditors, 29 IOWA J. CORP. L. 397, 412 (2004); Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability of
Professional Firms After Enron, 29 IOWA J. CORP. L. 427, 447 (2004); see also Jonathan Macey & Hillary
A. Sale, Observations on the Role of Commodification, Independence, and Governance in the Accounting
Industry, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1167, 1173 (2003). See infra text accompanying notes 95–100.
12

See e.g., Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, supra note 9; Macey, Efficient Capital
Markets, Corporate Disclosure, and Enron, supra note 9; Prentice, Inevitability of a Strong SEC, supra
note 10. See infra text accompanying notes 102–112.
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extensive review offered to provide context, a rewards program emerges as a way to meet
some of these limitations. The analysis in each of these Parts highlights how the
prevailing approach has the perverse effect of discouraging gatekeepers from performing
vital functions.
Part III explores ways to design positive incentives to promote effective capital
market gatekeeping. It draws on the intuition behind the evidence suggesting that
positive incentives can be more effective than negative threats in promoting desired
behavior. Positive incentives can induce gatekeepers to perform vital functions that the
current regime discourages them from performing. While the Article cannot provide all
the details of a comprehensive incentive program applicable for all gatekeepers in all
circumstances, it contributes a general framework, model and illustrations to contribute to
the emerging literature taking the rewards approach.
I. THEORY
This Part reviews the well-known theory of capital market gatekeeping. Section A
summarizes the standard model, distinguishing gatekeepers from whistleblowers and
from various hybrid roles that professionals can assume. Section B focuses on the
conditions necessary for effective gatekeeping (reputation and liability risk). Section C
discusses costs of the standard model. The review entices inquiry into how adding
explicit positive incentives can promote more effective gatekeeping.
A. Conceptions
Several varieties of third-party assistance in accessing capital markets exist. The
following considers the attributes and distinctions among those usually described as
“gatekeepers” and “whistleblowers” and then considers some that partake of attributes of
each (called hybrids below).
1. Gatekeepers — Gatekeepers work with an enterprise to correct mis-reporting
before it occurs.13 They do so by threatening to withhold support necessary to complete a
report or consummate a transaction. Gatekeepers can deny access to capital markets.14
So gatekeepers are “intermediaries who provide verification and certification services to

13

See Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective, 49 MD. L.
REV. 869, 883 (1990) (“A well-functioning gatekeeper regime is an elegant enforcement strategy.
Wrongdoing is prevented, rather than punished after the fact, without the substantial administrative costs of
a formal enforcement proceeding.”).
14

See Peter C. Kostant, Breeding Better Watchdogs: Multidisciplinary Partnerships in Corporate Legal
Practice, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1213, 1247 (2000).
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investors” by pledging their professional reputations15—and, by withholding such
support, block admission through the gate.16
Law’s gatekeeper approach always imposes a monitoring duty but not necessarily
a reporting duty: eventual discovery exposes the gatekeeper to liability for the primary
violation, not merely a remedy for non-reporting. Even so, the gatekeeper approach is
intended to give professionals regulatory incentives to prevent mis-reporting.17 Most
gatekeepers are paid for their services by the enterprises that retain them; all have stated
duties whose breach exposes them to legal liability.
Gatekeepers include auditors and attorneys, who work directly with and
essentially inside the enterprise. Auditors attest to financial statement assertions under
duties established by statute and articulated in professional codes of performance.18
Lawyers advise on transaction design and disclosure. Lawyers often determine whether
senior executives can sign disclosure documents and also provide written legal opinions
or memoranda concerning the legality of transactions and their compliance with law.
Duties of both auditors and lawyers arise initially from contract but include a regulatory
overlay of professional standards.
Gatekeepers also include other transaction participants, such as investment banks
and sometimes rating agencies, plus professionals working apart from transactions or
outside the enterprise, such as securities analysts, and possibly stock exchanges and
mutual funds.19 Unlike auditors and lawyers, these gatekeepers do not typically act under
any legal duty or vouch for statements that the enterprise makes about itself. Instead
15

John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic History of the 1990s, 89
CORNELL L. REV. 269, 279–280 (2004).

16

This reconciles what otherwise appear to be two distinct definitional conceptions of gatekeepers that
appear in the literature. See Erik F. Gerding, The Next Epidemic: Bubbles and the Growth and Decay of
Securities Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 393, n. 219 (2006) (identifying two strands of definition as those
who: (a) certify as reputational intermediaries or (b) restrict access and endorse those admitted with their
reputation for discretion); Peter Oh, Gatekeeping, 29 IOWA J. CORP. L. 735, 737 (2004) (noting conflation
of reputational intermediary and professional capable of disrupting entry and exploring the distinction).
17

Editors, Developments in the Law: Corporations and Society, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2227, 2245 (2004).

18

See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78j-1 (statute stating audit requirements for
detecting illegal acts); AICPA, Statement of Auditing Standards No. 54 (professional standards stating such
requirements, later adopted by the PCAOB); SEC, Auditor Independence Requirements (Nov. 21, 2000)
(regulations stating independence requirements); Statement of Auditing Standards No. 95 (professional
statement of generally accepted auditing standards, later adopted by the PCAOB); Statement of Auditing
Standards No. 99 (professional standards as to consideration of fraud in a financial statement audit, later
adopted by the PCAOB). As to standards originally established by the AICPA adopted by the PCOAB, see
SEC Order (April 25, 2003) (endorsing PCAOB adoption as interim standards those previously adopted by
the AICPA).

19

See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers: The Financial Statement Insurance Alternative to
Auditor Liability, 52 UCLA L. REV. 413, 417–18 n. 6 (2004)
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they provide their own statements, such as a securities rating or a buy-sell
recommendation.
Professionals within this broad conception of gatekeepers thus differ
significantly.20 Roles vary with product or service type and the information its buyers
and users receive. Also varying are what professionals attest to or certify, such as
fairness of financial statement assertions, legality of a securities issuance, quality of a
debt instrument and so on.21
Accordingly, also varying are all other public policy aspects of their respective
performance, including requirements, expectations, capacities, incentives and appropriate
legal liability for failure.22 Indeed, auditors and attorneys reside at opposite ends of a
gatekeeping spectrum: both put reputations and liability on the line but lawyers take
leading roles in deal design and disclosure preparation while auditors take back-up roles
in reviewing and testing disclosure.23 Despite these differences, the term gatekeeper has
assumed customary usage, not only in the academic literature but in official regulatory
pronouncements.24
2. Whistleblowers — Whistleblowers differ conceptually from gatekeepers.
While gatekeepers generally work with enterprises to negotiate access to capital markets
or deny it without further ado (keeping information confidential), whistleblowers report
violations to the public or to authorities.25 When gatekeepers determine that they cannot
exercise internal influence to correct statements that require correcting, they may resign
or otherwise withhold their services. However, this does not involve blowing a whistle to
any enforcement authority or the public.26 The distinctive feature of the whistleblower,
then, is that the third party discloses wrongdoing to authorities or third parties.27
20

See John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms,
84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 306 & 346–64 (stating that “all gatekeepers are not alike,” and developing proposals
with entirely different content for auditors and for securities lawyers).
21

See also Arthur B. Laby, Differentiating Gatekeepers, 1 BROOKLYN J. CORP., FIN. & COMM. L. 119, 12434 (distinguishing between independent and dependent gatekeepers) (2006).

22

See Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers, supra note 19, at n. 6.

23

Coffee, What Caused Enron, supra note 15, at 279–80.

24

See Coffee, What Caused Enron, supra note 15, at n. 35 (citing, for example, Revision of the
Commission’s Auditor Independence Requirements, Exchange Act Release No. 33-7870, 65 Fed. Reg.
43,148, 43,150 (July 12, 2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 240) (“the federal securities laws . . . make
independent auditors ‘gatekeepers’ to the public securities markets”)).

25

See generally STEPHEN M. KOHN, ET AL., WHISTLEBLOWER LAW: A GUIDE TO LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR
CORPORATE EMPLOYEES (2004).
26

See Howell E. Jackson, Reflections on Kaye Scholer: Enlisting Lawyers to Improve the Regulation of
Financial Institutions, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1019, 1028 n. 30 (1993) (“While disaffirmance or resignation
may have informational content in some cases, it is distinct from a pure whistleblowing obligation.”).

27

See Developments in the Law, supra note 17, at 2245.
6

There are three recognized forms of whistleblowers. The first is the volunteer
whose interest in whistle-blowing is not based on any duty and does not lead to any
reward.28 The classic example is the enterprise employee who comes forward with
evidence of wrongdoing. This employee is protected under various statutes against
retaliation and is entitled to compensatory damages arising from costs of pursuing this
redress. Notably, for employees, whistle-blowing doctrines usually provide job security,
resisting the enterprise’s temptations toward retaliatory discharge.29
The second is the volunteer who shares in a bounty arising from blowing the
whistle. Outside the securities context, the classic example is the qui tam action.30 The
most prominent illustrations are cases under the False Claims Act.31 Private parties are
vested with authority to prosecute claims of violations of laws and share in the recovery
on behalf of government. Analogous bounty schemes appear, including, in the securities
law context, the Securities and Exchange Commission’s insider trading bounty program32
and, in the tax context, the Internal Revenue Service’s informant rewards system.33
The third form of whistleblower is the non-volunteer, one with duties to come
forward and publicly disclose discovered wrongdoing. This type of whistleblower is also
primarily a gatekeeper but has specific additional whistle blowing duties. Consider, for
example, auditors. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA)34 expanded
auditor whistle-blowing obligations, requiring the reporting of illegal acts within an
enterprise and to the SEC if satisfactory responses are not forthcoming from within the
enterprise.35
28

See Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model To Encourage Corporate Whistleblowers,
2006 BYU L. REV. 1108, 1126–31 (discussing the standard “anti-retaliation” model in general and its
weaknesses in the particular context of capital market context)..
29

See Papps, supra note 2, at 112-17 & 119-20.

30

See generally Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (2002); Richard A. Bales, A
Constitutional Defense of Qui Tam, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 381; Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform, Qui Tam,
and the Role of the Plaintiff, 1997 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 167.
31

18 U.S.C. § 287 (2006).

32

17 C.F.R. 201 (2006); see also Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-1.

33

See Internal Revenue Service, Pub. No. 733, Rewards for Information Provided by Individuals to the
Internal Revenue Service (1997). For analysis of these and several other federal bounty programs, see
Marsha J. Ferziger & Daniel G. Currell, Snitching for Dollars: The Economics and Public Policy of
Federal Civil Bounty Programs, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1141.

34

Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737, 758 codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4.

35

See Kostant, Breeding Better Watchdogs, supra note 14, at 1246, n. 150. Notably, few reports have been
made under this provision. See U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Securities Exchange Act: Review of
7

3. Hybrids — Despite conceptual distinctions, the categories of gatekeeper and
whistleblower can sometimes overlap and give rise to hybrids. For example, auditors
can perform roles that partake of both a gatekeeper and a whistleblower function.
Suppose an auditor determines that a client is committing illegal acts and the client
refuses to redress the violations. It must both resign from the engagement and disclose
the illegal acts.36 That exercises both the gatekeeping function by refusing support and
the whistle-blowing by reporting to the authorities. Lawyers may be seen either as
gatekeepers or whistleblowers in circumstances when their duty of client confidentiality
comes into tension with their duty to avoid assisting in criminal or fraudulent activity.37
The SEC’s struggle to formulate rules governing lawyer professionalism reveals
the difficulty of classifying attorneys as either gatekeepers or whistleblowers.38 As
adopted, SEC rules permit but do not require disclosing confidential information to
prevent crime or fraud.39 That does not quite fit the typical whistleblower classification,
the essence of which is reporting.40 The SEC proposed, but did not adopt, the so-called
“noisy withdrawal” alternative, which contemplates a lawyer announcing publicly its
resignation based on perceived client violations.41 This appears closer to the typical
Reporting Under Section 10A, at 2 (2003), available at http:// www.gao.gov/new.items/d03982r.pdf.; John
C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1306 n. 39
(2003) (citing SEC reports). Professor Coffee attributes this either to few actual problems or rationalized
self-interest. Another likely possibility is the chaperon thesis, in which auditors observing problems get
them corrected so the client can be admitted, not bounced. That is, they perform their gatekeeping function
first.
36

Sec. & Exch. Comm., Reg. S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.304 (Item 304); Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
10A(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. 78h-1 (2007) (illegal acts); see Darin Bartholomew, Is Silence Golden When It Comes
to Auditing, 36 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 57, 93–102 (2002); Kostant, Breeding Better Watchdogs, supra note
14, at 1245–46.
37

See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 553, 562–563 (1989) (construing and applying “crime-fraud
exception to the attorney-client privilege”); Tamar R. Brickhead, The Conviction of Lynne Stewart and the
Uncertain Future of the Right to Defend, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 5-10 (2006) (critical discussion of
criminal conviction of criminal defense lawyer concerning activities arising out of the attorney-client
relationship); Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers § 67 (2000); Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct
R. 1.6(b) (2004); Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.13(c)); see also Richard W. Painter & Jennifer E.
Duggan, Lawyer Disclosure of Corporate Fraud: Establishing a Firm Foundation, 50 SMU L. REV. 225
(1996) (exploring imposition of affirmative duties on auditors respecting steps to take when confronting
corporate and exploring how one would adapt analogous provisions for the legal profession).
38

See Roger C. Cramton, George M. Cohen & Susan P. Koniak, Legal and Ethical Duties of Lawyers After
Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 VILL. L. REV. 725, 779–810 (2004) (extensive discussion and analysis of the “reporting
out” concept).

39

See 17 C.F.R. 205.3(d)(2) (2003), http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8185.htm

40

Developments in the Law, supra note 17, at 2245–46.

41

Cramton, Cohen & Koniak, supra note 38, at 810–813 (recapitulation of analysis of the proposed “noisy
withdrawal” concept).
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whistle-blowing class,42 but is not quite whistle-blowing due to limitations arising from
the attorney-client privilege.43
Nor do SEC rules as adopted embrace the gatekeeping model. Under the rules,
lawyers must report violations to designated internal officials within the enterprise (called
“up-the-ladder reporting”) without necessarily reporting to outside authorities.44 But other
elements of the gatekeeping model are missing: up-the-ladder reporting does not include
the standard gatekeeping remedy of denying a client capital market access by withholding
transactional support.45 So lawyers no doubt play a role in superintending capital market
integrity, although it is not exactly clear whether they are gatekeepers or whistle-blowers
or something more of a hybrid.
B. Conditions
Law’s whistle-blowing model is simpler than its gatekeeping model. The former
relies upon either payment or protection without venturing into the terms of the
relationship between the actor and the wrongdoer. The gatekeeping model must not only
design a relationship and specify duties, it must attend to the roles that reputation and
liability play in its operation. Consequently, numerous conditions must obtain for a
gatekeeping model to succeed.
As a threshold matter, and in keeping with the metaphor, there must be a gate to
keep. It must be one that an enterprise has to traverse to access capital markets and there
can be no other way through it—at least some gatekeeper must tend the gate. Likewise,
the gate cannot be opened absent a keeper’s volition. The metaphor attempts to capture
initial offerings of securities as well as secondary market transactions and periodic
reporting exercises.

42

Developments in the Law, supra note 17, at 2246.

43

M. Peter Moser & Stanley Keller, Sarbanes-Oxley 307: Trusted Counselors or Informers?, 49 VILL. L.
REV. 833, 848–849 (2004) (summarizing grounds for objecting to the noisy withdrawal concept reflecting
tensions with traditional values embedded in the attorney-client relationship).
44

17 C.F.R. 205.3(d)(2) (2003), http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8185.htm.

45

See Coffee, The Attorney as Gatekeeper, supra note 35, at 1301–1302 (distinguishing up-the-ladder
reporting required from “other, potentially more extensive gatekeeping duties”). On these and other
aspects of the SEC rulemaking in this context, see Stephen M. Bainbridge & Christina J. Johnson,
Managerialism, Legal Ethics, and Sarbanes-Oxley Section 307, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 299, [pin cite]
(Section 307 and the Part 205 Rules give lawyers many ways to avoid reporting, so incentives have not
changed much); Peter C. Kostant, Sarbanes-Oxley and Changing the Norms of Corporate Lawyering, 2004
MICH. ST. L. REV. 541, 550-58(Section 307 and the Part 205 Rules have flaws but bode well to improve
normative self-conception of securities lawyers to assume gatekeeper function); Lisa H. Nicholson, SarbOx
307’s Impact on Subordinate In-House Counsel: Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 2004 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 559, 603-13 (failure to distinguish and give special dispensation to low level in-house counsel is
defect in Part 205 Rules).

9

More fundamentally, the keeper must be able to influence the petitioner, to groom
it for admission. For example, the third party must be able to promote fair reporting.
That implies a universe of participants connected to initial, periodic or transactional
reporting exercises. Federal securities laws have long imposed duties and associated
liability risks on such persons and private and SEC enforcement actions make the risk
real.46 This approach can be justified by how these third parties enjoy low-cost access to
information and can provide a “private monitoring service on behalf of the capital
markets.”47
Gatekeepers must be independent and possess sufficient stakes in their reputations
as keepers so that petitioner bribes cannot weaken their resolve. Legal theorists
emphasize that keepers can be effective when many petitioners seek entrance so that no
admission fee (or bribe) can outweigh the expected costs of admitting the inadmissible.48
As Professor Coffee says, “At least in theory, a gatekeeper would not rationally sacrifice
this reputational capital for a single client who accounts for only a small portion of its
revenues.”49
So the third party must be an “outsider” in the sense that it commands assets apart
from the enterprise and its individual members pursue careers apart from the enterprise.50
This creates an incentive structure that differs from the enterprise and its employees.51
As Professor Kraakman explained in his pioneering analysis, third parties usually “are
likely to have less to gain and more to lose from [misleading reporting] than inside
managers.”52 The stakes for these gatekeepers are influenced by both reputation and
liability concerns, and their components can operate at the levels of individual actors,
their firms and entire professions. Each influence is considered in turn.
1. Reputation — Enterprises accessing capital markets can use two reputations to
signal reliability: their own reputations for candor and that of their gatekeepers for
thoroughness and veracity. Enterprises seeking access, initially or as an ongoing matter,
46

Section 11 of the 1933 act and Section 10 of the 1934 Act impose these duties and risks. Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j; see also 15 U.S.C. § 77(q)(a)
(imposing on auditors the duties of inquiry and disclosure); 15 U.S.C. § 78r (creating private rights of
action against persons, including accountants, who “make or cause to be made” materially misleading
statements in reports or other documents filed with the SEC).

47

See Kraakman, Corporate Liability, supra note 5, at 891.

48

See Poonam Puri, Taking Stock of Taking Stock, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 99, 146 (2001).

49

Coffee, The Attorney as Gatekeeper, supra note 35, at 1269.

50

Kraakman, Corporate Liability, supra note 5, at 891.

51

Professor Kraakman’s chief insight is that “whenever potential offenders must employ incorruptible
outsiders to gain legitimacy or expertise or to met [sic] a legal requirement, gatekeeper liability will thwart
a class of offenses that are unreachable through enterprise-level or managerial sanctions.” Id.

52

Id.
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develop or have their own reputations for the quality of their disclosure, on the range
from fair to misleading reporting. Candid enterprises enjoy more investor trust.53 The
more valuable a reputation is, the greater is the cost of jeopardizing it through
opportunistic abuse of that trust.54
Enterprises can hire third-parties to achieve similar purposes. The enterprise can
hire attorneys, auditors, underwriters, and rating agencies to provide reports backed by
their respective reputations for thoroughness and veracity. Thorough and honest
gatekeepers enjoy more credibility, a valuable trait. The more valuable it is, the greater is
the risk of reputation loss so that, at some point, no additional incentives are necessary.55
The more frequently firms are employed to serve as gatekeepers, and the larger
the number of repeat occasions in which they expect to play these roles, the greater the
value.56 Enterprises pay fees for this credence. Investors and other market participants
appreciate these as valuable signals.57 When operating effectively, they contribute to a
market in which securities prices tend to converge accurately toward the fundamental
value of the related enterprise.58
Most gatekeepers are part of a profession that boasts its own reputation. An
individual’s or firm’s membership in a profession creates an externality—each member
of the profession exploits the profession’s reputation.59 An individual’s or firm’s
investment in reputation should generate not only private benefits for them, but also
wider benefits for the profession. If so, firms and individuals can free ride on the
investments of others. That can have the effect of reducing incentives to invest. The
effect is dramatized by the presence of so-called bucket shops, securities firms engaged in

53

Joseph A. Franco, Why Antifraud Prohibitions are not Enough: The Significance of Opportunism,
Candor and Signaling in the Economic Case for Mandatory Securities Disclosure, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 223, 308–11.
54

See id.

55

See Victor P. Goldberg, Accountable Accountants: Is Third-Party Liability Necessary?, 17 J. LEG. STUD.
295, 312 (1988) (reputations of auditors sufficient so third-party liability not necessary).
56

See David Charney, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 375, 408–25
(1990).
57

Coffee, What Caused Enron, supra note 15, at 279–80 (2004) (“[The] market recognizes that the
gatekeeper has less incentive to deceive than does its client and thus regards the gatekeeper’s assurance or
evaluation as more credible than the client’s statements.”).
58

See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV.
549, 618–21 (1984) (investment bankers’ good reputations promote efficient markets).
59

Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L.
REV. 781, 787–88 (2001) [hereinafter Black, Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets].
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small-scale deception while benefiting from the securities profession’s broader
reputation. The problem can creep into the practices of law and public accounting.60
Professions address these externality and free rider problems using various
strategies. First, professional membership associations articulate professional codes of
gatekeeper ethics or conduct. These codes effectively admonish that admitting the
inadmissible is simply wrong. Indeed, to some extent, the professional identifies of
lawyers and accountants are based upon such codes.61
Second, such associations may provide or promote licensing or disciplining
schemes that implicitly vouch for each gatekeeper.62 Examples are the programs
overseen by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA)63 for
auditors and the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD)64 for securities firms,
including underwriters. Professional associations can police reputations of members and
deny admission to unqualified applicants or expel non-compliant members. Resulting
threats may improve a profession’s return on investment in reputation by individuals and
firms.
While profession-driven reputation protection can be critical, the professions have
not proven particularly good at providing it.65 This mixed success could be due, in part,
to how the professions’ toolboxes contain sticks and not carrots. True, licenses are carrots
when first issued, as a badge of professional honor.66 But the threat of revocation is
more nearly a stick. Enforcement leads to suspensions or expulsions.
Even so, professional aspirations suggest the importance of culture and norms in
any analysis of reputation as a constraint on gatekeeper performance. This entails an
enormously complex set of factors that it is difficult to untangle and exceedingly difficult
for law to micro-manage.67 Law can tinker with procedures and policies but these must
60

See id.

61

See Pamela S. Karlan, Contingent Fees and Criminal Cases, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 595, 629-32 (1993)
(lawyers as gatekeepers in respect to contingent fees in criminal cases); David B. Wilkins, Who Should
Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 801, 811 (1992) (noting that ABA ethics code “constitute[s] the
most influential source[] of professional norms”).

62

Black, Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, supra note 59, at 788–89.

63

See www.aicpa.org.

64

See www.nasd.org.

65

See Prentice, Inevitability of a Strong SEC, supra note 10, at 788-89 & 795-97 (as to NASD and New
York Stock Exchange).

66

Black, Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, supra note 59, at 788–89.

67

An abundant literature written in recent decades explores the relationship of norms to law, how norms are
formed, and their role in influencing compliance with law. See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER
WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Understanding Norms,
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be tailored to the peculiar attributes of a profession and in tune with idiosyncrasies of
given firms and individuals.68
To highlight some of these complexities, there is debate about exactly what kind
of reputation various gatekeepers seek to maintain.69 For auditors, it commonly is said
that their reputation for honesty is their most valuable asset.70 But as a matter of practice
for effective auditing, more important is a reputation with management for toughness.71
For lawyers, there is disagreement as to whether they seek to develop reputations with
managers for complicity and empathy or with external investors for performing any kind
of gatekeeping function.72
2. Liability — An extensive literature dissects the components and effectiveness
of first-party versus third-party liability enforcement strategies. First-party liability
punishes the primary wrongdoer, and legal theory predicts a deterrent effect ex ante and a
cost-internalization ex post.73 Third-party liability supplements this device to address
residual risks that the former fails to deter or so internalize.74 It works when a third party
is able to deter or coerce cost-internalization. Law exploits this ability by imposing
liability threats on gatekeepers based on primary violations of their clients.
Securities professionals have duties: approving transactions, designing or opining
on them or related disclosure, and providing assurance and attestation of financial
statement assertions. Failure in these duties triggers liability under various state and
federal claims, a panoply of SEC administrative sanctions, and criminal law.75 In
significant part, these doctrines are based on a theory of deterrence, a negative injunction

49 U. TORONTO L.J. 177 (1999); ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000); see also sources cited
infra note 235.
68

See Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry Into Lawyers’ Responsibility
for Clients’ Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75, 115 (1993) [hereinafter Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers?].
69

See McGowan, Why Not Try the Carrot?, supra note 4, at 1828.

70

E.g., DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J.) (“An accountant’s
greatest asset is its reputation for honesty, followed closely by its reputation for careful work”), cert. denied
498 U.S. 941 (1990).

71

See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Too Big to Fail: Moral Hazard in Auditing and the Need to Restructure
the Industry before it Unravels, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1698, 1726–27 (2006).

72

See Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers?, supra note 68, at 101–11; McGowan, Why Not Try the
Carrot?, supra note 4, at 1833–34.
73

See Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate
Liability Regimes, 72 NYU L. Rev. 687,701-05 (1997).
74

Kraakman, Corporate Liability, supra note 5, at 701-05.

75

See Puri, supra note 48, at 148–49 (reviewing all these liability risks).
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to discourage misbehavior.76 Scholars endlessly debate and policy analysts endlessly
tinker with the numerous intricacies of this framework to seek its optimal structure.77 The
following briefly highlights several examples.
Some believe that the liability risk need not be as great as is traditional in the
United States—a few high-damage lawsuits a decade are enough.78 Others believe that
even less liability risk is necessary for lawyers, because they are naturally cautious by
training, represent clients with liability risk on the line, and protect their reputations by
keeping their clients out of losing securities lawsuits.79 Yet others cite the benefits of
increasing liability with a hint of incontestability. Thus, “[r]aising the penalties for both
primary and third parties can be an effective way to make gatekeeping regimes work.”80
Professor Coffee states: “The more we suspect that attorneys will avert their gaze, the
more we need to raise the penalties to deter them from so doing.”81
The shape of liability exposure can be altered, as by expanding the scope of duties
or of doctrines such as broad interpretations of concepts like “substantial assistance” used
to impose liability.82 Or due diligence duties could be specified expansively. Third-party
liability can be strict (as under the doctrine of respondeat superior) or duty-based (as
under the doctrines of aiding-and-abetting or negligent non-detection).83

76

See Michael A. Perino, Enron’s Legislative Aftermath: Some Reflections on the Deterrence Aspects of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 671, 676 (2002). See generally Gary S. Becker,
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, in ESSAYS IN THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT 1 (GARY S. BECKER & WILLIAM M. LANDES EDS., 1974).
77

See, e.g., Timothy F. Malloy, Regulation, Compliance and the Firm, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 451, 497-523
(2003) (conceiving regulatory compliance as another routine for an organization pursued the way other
routines are, to supplement typical profit-maximizing and law-abiding images for a realistic appraisal);
Geraldine Szott Moohr, An Enron Lesson: The Modest Role of Criminal Law in Preventing Corporate
Crime, 55 FLA. L. REV. 937, 956–73 (2003) (showing limitations of rational choice and unconscious
instinct models of obedience, the former due to biased judgment risk impairing calculability and the latter
offset by competing social forces at sub-group levels such as corporate culture and observing that
additional incentives are supplied by private and regulatory enforcement).
78

Black, Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, supra note 59, at 794 (accountants) & 795 (bankers).

79

Id. at 795 & 800.

80

Kostant, Breeding Better Watchdogs, supra note 14, at 1248, n. 159.

81

Coffee, The Attorney as Gatekeeper, supra note 35, at 1306.

82

Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers?, supra note 68, at 115.

83

Compare Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at the Gatekeepers, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 491, 540-46 (2001)
(exploring strict liability for auditors) with John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform, supra note
20, at 354 (evaluating relative strict liability for auditors such as a limitation on liability based on an
affirmative defense requiring proof of non-negligence and good faith).
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Some believe in the possibility of calibrating the duty to the penalties in optimal
ways, as by a sliding scale on which, as liability standards move from negligence to strict
liability, associated punishment for violations can be relaxed accordingly.84 Others
contend that an optimal regime would allow gatekeepers to negotiate contracts with
clients stating the levels of review and assurance to be provided, along with express terms
of liability exposure tailored to that performance.85
Scholars debate the method and effectiveness of alternatives means of
enforcement. They debate the scope of private rights of action under Section 10b or argue
that stepped up public (SEC) enforcement is superior.86 In this quest, also relevant is the
relative ability of enforcement authorities to learn of violations that warrant enforcement
activity.87 Damages caps and safe harbors are likewise debated, along with the role of
insurance.88 To conclude this non-exhaustive highlight of the many contestable
parameters of system design, scholars debate the merits of enterprise versus individual
liability.89
Finally, some believe that the corollary of liability regulation works too. Consider
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines addressing corporate criminality. While increasing
sanctions on the guilty, they also reduce sanctions for those who actively seek to deter,
detect and disrupt.90 As Professor Kostant opines, “by greatly reducing the penalties for
corporations that detect and disclose criminal activities, and requiring directors to
cooperate in the prosecution of wrongdoers, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines offer a

84

E.g., Kostant, Breeding Better Watchdogs, supra note 14, at 1248.

85

See Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 NW. L. REV. 916, 951-58 (1998).

86

For a well-known debate along these lines, see Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of
Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission’s Authority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 963 (1994);
Joseph A. Grundfest, Why Disimply?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 727 (1995); Joel Seligman, A Comment on
Professor Grundfest’s “Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The
Commission’s Authority,” 108 HARV. L. REV 438 (1994).

87

Assaf Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 53, 102-08 (2003) (providing a framework for
choosing strict versus duty- or knowledge-based liability according to how equipped enforcement
authorities are to enforce violations—the less equipped, the greater the need for strict liability and vice
versa—and locating auditor performance under the knowledge-based end).

88

Compare Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open Market Securities Frauds, 38 ARIZ. L.
REV. 639, 657-62 (1996) (exploring parameters of potentially appropriate liability caps for non-privity
federal securities fraud cases) with Harvey J. Goldschmid, Capping Securities Fraud Damages: An Unwise
Proposal in an Imperfect World, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 665, 666-67(1996) (commenting on the foregoing article
by Professor Langevoort and objecting to damages caps as risking integrity of securities markets by
reducing managerial incentives to promote faithful financial reporting).
89

See, e.g., Kraakman, Corporate Liability, supra note 5, at 867-68.

90

Kostant, Breeding Better Watchdogs, supra note 14, at 1245, n. 146.
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‘legal bribe’ to encourage gatekeeping.”91 These examples represent progress compared
to the in terrorum approach of liability threats.
C. Costs
The benefits of a regime of third-party liability discussed in the preceding section
carry a number of costs. First, associated duties entail time, effort, training and other
costs of precaution and implementation. Even the best-laid execution will not prevent
mis-reporting. The fraud artists who pass through the gate undetected create additional
costs in legal liability, borne either by the subject gatekeeper or by insurance. Litigation
and administration costs are considerable, including costs associated with defending
against non-meritorious claims.
Second, liability risk can overshoot the mark, at least in some contexts. The risk
of error may create excessive risk-aversion.92 Costs of a gatekeeper liability regime are
increased (and otherwise unnecessary) compliance burdens on those predisposed to report
fairly. A related cost is how third-parties, reflecting their own liability risk, will charge a
premium or require over-investment in enterprise compliance and control infrastructure.
Related costs can be passed on to enterprises, ultimately increasing their cost of capital.
Smaller businesses are invariably hurt disproportionately.
Third, and given scant attention in the literature, while liability risk may deter, it
may also make gatekeepers unwilling to undertake functions that would otherwise be
desirable for them to perform. For example, auditors always have resisted accepting any
undertaking to detect for fraud or opine on the reasonableness of management’s
accounting choices.93 Lawyers likewise resist imposition of any obligations that even
remotely threaten the jealously guarded attorney-client privilege and doctrines of
confidentiality.94
II. FAILURE
This Part reviews the literature diagnosing the episodes of financial mis-reporting
of the early 2000s that showed limitations on the traditional gatekeeping model. Section
A discusses diminished reputation constraints that affected partners, firms, and
professions as a whole. Section B considers how reduced liability risk may have
magnified these limitations. Section C explores systemic features that pose inherent
limitations for the traditional gatekeeping model. In each case, discussion indicates how
these limitations endure despite various reforms made in response to the period’s
91

Id. at n. 164 (citing Kraakman, Corporate Liability, supra note 5, at 70–71) (discussing the use of legal
bribes to promote effective gatekeeping).

92

See Choi, supra note 85, at 955

93

See COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 9, at 166-68]; infra text accompanying notes 197-202.

94

See McGowan, Why Not Try the Carrot?, supra note 4, at 1846-54.
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transgressions. The analysis concludes that diagnosis and reform invariably focus on
negative threats associated with reputation and liability risk but that a more promising
avenue is to consider positive incentive programs.
A. Diminished Reputation Constraints
The third-party model requires incentives for gatekeepers to turn away the
inadmissible (or for whistleblowers to turn them in). A series of factors limiting the
power of reputational constraints during the late 1990s and early 2000s may have
impaired these incentives—at the levels of partners, firms and professions.
1. Partners — A common diagnosis of mis-aligned incentives considers the
partner-level behavior of gatekeeper professionals. It makes the conventional supposition
that it is irrational for a large firm (such as Arthur Andersen LLP) to sacrifice its
reputational capital for a single enterprise (such as Enron Corp.) but it may not be
irrational for particular partners to do so.95 This occurs when individual partners have
only one client, making their career depend on pleasing its management.
According to this line of thought, “debacles like Enron’s were inevitable in an
environment that rewards audit partners who are captured by their client and punishes
those who report negative information about their clients through the proper corporate
channels.”96 This diagnosis underscores the value of rewarding those who disrupt misreporting.
A related diagnosis emphasizes how a firm that allows its partners’ careers to
depend on single clients commits colossal error, compounded when the firm relies solely
on that partner—or a small coterie working with that partner—for information about the
engagement. Such a practice can impair the condition of independence necessary for
effective gatekeeping.97 Yet it occurred at Enron and perhaps on other engagements.98 At
minimum, these errors indicate superior methods of internal assignment allocation.
For lawyers, the one-client problem was less obvious, as most law firm partners
provide the specialized services to a broad range of clients.99 On the other hand, some
evidence from the period indicated a decline in this constraint for other reasons, chiefly
when lawyers’ compensation was paid, in part, in equity in their client firms.100 This
95

See sources cited supra note 11.

96

Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure, and Enron, supra note 11, at 407–08.

97

See supra text accompanying notes 48-52.

98

Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure, and Enron, supra note 11, at 410.

99

See Coffee, The Attorney as Gatekeeper, supra note 35, at 1305–06 (noting that the one-client problem
for audit partners can impair the reputational constraint at partner level but how this is not so at law firms).

100

See Puri, supra note 48; see also John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, The Decline in Lawyer
Independence: Lawyer Equity Investments in Clients, 81 TEX. L. REV. 405, 481–85 (2002) (discussing
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problem could impair the reputational constraint at the partner level by a desire to
increase the value of that equity, either to increase personal or firm wealth.
2. Firms — For many decades, the reputational constraint, backstopped by a
modest threat of legal liability, satisfied the gatekeeper model’s requirements.101 But
during the 1990s, a pillar of the reputational constraint changed, especially for audit
firms. During that period, the percentage of audit firm revenues from traditional auditing
services shrank as revenues skyrocketed from consulting services (ranging from business
strategy to technology management).102 The significant cross-selling of consulting
services to a firm’s auditing clients meant that auditors would lose considerable
consulting revenue if they were to sever clients or blow the whistle on them.103
Cross-selling essentially eliminated one of the vital guarantors of auditor
independence: the strong signal emitted when an auditor severs a client relationship.104
The signaling power when an auditor fires a client arises because the enterprise must
have an auditor while the auditor need not retain any given client. Enterprises that
auditors fire thus lose much more than the auditor loses. They may be unable to find any
auditor at all after being severed. The auditor may even gain reputation value from this
sternness and this could enable it to attract new clients.105
Yet, during the 1990s, the incidence of auditor vetogating declined due to shifts in
power from auditors to clients.106 According to this diagnosis, the existing auditing
traditional gatekeeper liability theory and noting controversy as to suitability of lawyers to perform the
function); Christine Hurt, Counselor, Gatekeeper, Shareholder, Thief: Why Attorneys who Invest in their
Clients in a Post-Enron World Are “Selling Out”, Not “Buying In,” 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 897, 935-38 (2005).
101

See Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, supra note 9, at 1350.

102

Prentice, Inevitability of a Strong SEC, supra note 10, at 786 (“[C]onsulting fees rose from seventeen
percent of audit fees in 1990 to sixty-seven percent in 1999”) (citing Richard M. Frankel et al., The
Relation Between Auditors’ Fees for Non-Audit Services and Earnings Management, 77 ACCT. REV.
(Supp.) 71, 89 (2002)); Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, supra note 9, at 1350
(describing how fees from audit clients for non-audit services rose from 13% of revenues in the 1970s to
50% of revenues in the 1990s).
103

Professor Prentice documents factors that had the same weakening effect at all other gatekeepers,
including lawyers, analysts, rating agencies, bankers, mutual funds and stock exchanges. See Prentice,
Inevitability of a Strong SEC, supra note 10, at 786–98.

104

See Jeffrey N. Gordon What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Modern Business
Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1237 (2002) (most important guarantor of
auditor independence is saliency of auditor terminations, a material event that must promptly be disclosed,
but the value of which drops dramatically when audit firms cross-sell consulting services which give
auditor incentives not to sever clients).
105

The danger in this structure—also true of a rewards program—is auditor strategic behavior, in which
they fire entirely responsible clients to shine their image and attract other shinier clients. See, e.g., Macey &
Sale, Observations on the Role of Commodification, supra note 11, at 1176. The effect, in any event, is a
kind of balance of power between enterprises and auditors, one of “mutual reputation enhancement.” Id.
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Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure, and Enron, supra note 11, at 409.
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structure “will not function properly until a lead audit partner can confidently fire a
dishonest client without jeopardizing his career.”107 In the period after the SarbanesOxley Act became law, the number of audit firms firing clients increased dramatically.108
It is hard to determine exactly why auditors increasingly severed clients during
this period. Some evidence indicates a tendency to sever smaller enterprises not larger
ones,109 even though all frauds leading to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act involved large
enterprises.110 Moreover, Sarbanes-Oxley does not ban all non-audit services, leaving a
large exception for tax services to clients.111 This is both lucrative and a context in which
acute risk of illegality and fraud appear.112 Accordingly, while these reforms respond
proportionately to a firm-level factor that reduced the reputational constraint’s power,
more policy levers may need plying.
3. Professions — Auditing industry concentration may have increased erosion of
audit quality. Mergers during the 1990s reduced the number of large audit firms from
107

Id.

108

See Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure and Reform, supra note 20, at 348, n. 148 (“In 2003, over 1460 public
companies changed auditors, which was the highest number in at least five years. Although such switches
could be because the client was dissatisfied with the auditor, many were because the auditor considered the
client too risky—or because the auditor raised its fees in light of that increased risk. . . . By itself, this
evidence may not prove that auditors are becoming significantly more selective with regard to clients, but it
is at least consistent with such a hypothesis.”).

109

An extensive contemporary and historical literature investigates the multiple aspects of auditor
switching. Among recent contributions suggesting that increased switching after Sarbanes-Oxley is not
strictly due to those reforms but at least potentially related to client size, see Michael Ettredge, Chan Li &
Susan Scholz, Audit Fees and Auditor Realignments in the Sarbanes-Oxley Era, U. Kansas Working Paper
(Nov. 2005) (“[A]uditors tend to resign from companies that pay relatively lower fees [and those] whose
auditors resign also are characterized by smaller size, negative income (losses), and prior receipt of going
concern audit reports”); see also Wayne R. Landsman, Karen K. Nelson & Brian R. Rountree, An
Empirical Analysis of Big N Auditor Switches (2005) (detailing pre-SOX study of switches during 1993 to
2001 showing that resignations of large audit firms commonly result in the client engaging another large
audit firm).
110

See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It Might
Just Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 923–28 (2003) (chronicling the road to SOX from the implosion of the
“Big Four Frauds,” referring to Qwest Communications, Inc.; WorldCom, Inc.; Global Crossing, Ltd.; and
Enron Corp., and noting that the statute takes the unusual step for legislation of mentioning the latter two
by name).
111

See Matthew J. Barrett, “Tax Services” as a Trojan Horse in the Auditor Independence Provisions of
Sarbanes-Oxley, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 463, 485-502 (noting continuing auditor dependence on clients to
whom they render tax services which are still allowed).
112

See United States v. Stein, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42915, [pin cite] (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2006); United
States v. KPMG LLP, 316 F. Supp. 2d 30, [pin cite] (D.D.C. 2004) (facts at preliminary stage of Internal
Revenue Service and Department of Justice investigations into criminal conduct at KPMG, which
eventually led to the firm’s narrowly escaping a criminal indictment); see also Sheldon D. Pollack & Jay A.
Soled, Tax Professionals Behaving Badly, 105 TAX NOTES 201, 210 (2004).
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eight to five and the dissolution of Arthur Andersen reduced it further to the current
four.113 These firms are massive compared to the next largest firms, with annual revenue
at the four large firms reaching $20 billion compared to $1 billion for the next largest
firms.114 This concentration in the industry’s upper tier reduces the importance of
product differentiation.115 With a large number of firms, competition can concentrate on
product differentiation, including investment in reputation; with so few firms, reduced
competition diminishes incentives to invest in reputation and thus diminishes the power
of the reputational constraint.116
A final—and pervasive—limitation on gatekeeping efficacy is how the enterprise
pays the gatekeeper.117 That creates an inherent inclination for solicitude, simply to
retain business. Numerous solutions to this limitation have been proposed, some applied
to auditors and some to other intermediaries. Examples include using insurance
markets,118 public funding,119 funding through stock exchanges120 or voucher financing
programs.121
None of these has been adopted in the United States. Instead, the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act adopts a more cautious ground. This reposes in an issuer’s board audit committee the
authority to determine auditor compensation (and other auditor oversight, including
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(2004)); Eric L. Talley, Cataclysmic Liability Risk among Big-Four Auditors, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1641,
[pin cite] (2006).
116

O’Connor, Be Careful What you Wish For, supra note 10, at 787–88; Prentice, Inevitability of a Strong
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retention and dismissal).122 One benefit of this approach is that audit committees can be
conceptualized as gatekeepers, of a fashion, and there is some theoretical support for
believing that having one gatekeeper pay another is an effective way to increase overall
gatekeeping effectiveness.123
B. Reduced Liability Risk
Several legal changes during the 1990s reduced the exposure of secondary actors
to legal liability for failure to promote fair reporting. First, the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) changed the liability regime from joint-and-several
liability to proportionate so that gatekeepers no longer are liable for the entirety of
damages but only for their share of culpability.124 Second, the Supreme Court held that
the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws do not reach those who aid or abet
others in mis-reporting.125 While this did not prevent SEC actions under that theory, it
significantly curtailed private actions.126 Such changes reduced the legal liability threat,
which could have been a factor in declining propensity to protect reputations for integrity
as gatekeepers (or whistleblowers).127 When combined with the other factors noted
above, incentives for quality gatekeeping declined.128
A related diagnostic concerning audit firms is based on changing forms of liability
structures.129 Audit firms shifted from partnerships to limited liability entities.130 This
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reduced incentives to maintain internal control, as litigation risk fell along with concern
with steps that would reduce it.131 At least in the case of Enron, this diagnosis concludes,
“[i]t seems doubtful that this situation would have existed if the firm had been operating
under a legal regime in which partners were jointly and severally liable for negligence,
audits were tied to reputation and not sold as commodities, and auditors were truly
independent.”132
Much more could be said about the sources of litigation risk and how they change
over time through doctrinal evolution or regulatory reform. As the discussion of liability
risk in the previous section attests, it is notoriously difficult to use alternative legal
designs to achieve desired results.133 It is particularly perplexing to meet the specific
objective of setting an optimal level of deterrence.134
That discussion also shows how fair it is to say that the role of liability risk is a
dominant feature of the scholarly literature. Perhaps more litigation risk helps to reverse
certain causes of gatekeeper failure. But further discussion of that strategy in this review
will not advance that cause. Indeed, the following discussion identifies systemic factors
that impair gatekeeper effectiveness, most of which are beyond the reach of any liability
threats to control.
C. Systemic Factors
Systemic features of the gatekeeping landscape can influence its effectiveness.
Two broad forces appeared to operate during the late 1990s when considerable
limitations in the gatekeeper model appeared.
First, the era was characterized by financial euphoria.135 A technological
revolution occurred that altered means and methods of doing business and of many forms
of human activity. In this and other such periods, a critical mass of persons throughout
all sectors of society—including enterprises and investors and their professional advisors
and gatekeepers—came to assume that a new era had emerged, for which the traditional
norms of business and standards of accounting were less suited.136 It becomes easy in
such periods to suspend critical judgment, including as to conventional matters of
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corporate governance and financial reporting. Any gatekeeping model will suffer serious
stress in such periods.137
Second, a systemic emphasis on gatekeepers can backfire. Gatekeepers stake
reputations and liability only to the extent that there is at least a reasonable chance that
mis-reporting will be uncovered in circumstances that damage reputation and create legal
liability. But, especially during a euphoric period, and when gatekeepers are the
centerpiece of a regime’s integrity, professionals may believe that their transgressions can
escape notice. If the system relies on gatekeepers to promote fair reporting, and
gatekeepers know that, it is not irrational for gatekeepers to believe that they can conceal
complicity.
For this reason, more elaborate gatekeeping theories emphasize using a multitude
of gatekeepers as cross-checks, so that no one gatekeeper can ensure permanent
concealment.138 Alas, in euphoric periods, even a well-thatched mass of cross-checking
gatekeepers can be of limited effect. Collective suspension of objectivity can induce
mutual myopia, as when auditors defer to lawyers who approve an approach to a
reporting question while lawyers defer to the auditors who do so.139
The bubble problem is recurring rather than continuing. Other cultural factors of
a more enduring nature can impair gatekeeper effectiveness. Critical to success is having
individuals within professional firms capable of advancing and protecting the firm’s
reputation. This bonding is more likely in cultures where individuals enjoy and expect to
have long-term relationships with a single firm. In recent generations, however, cultural
forces have led to far greater mobility among professionals, such as auditors and
lawyers.140 They move from firm to firm more often than in previous generations. This
reduces the bonding between individuals and firms and related individual incentives to
advance and protect firm reputations.141
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Bonding also was impaired when clients began more frequently to use different
firms for different kinds of services; for example, when an enterprise that once used a
single outside law firm for nearly all its legal needs increasingly began to use numerous
different firms.142 That too breaks long-term bonds that concentrate on advancing and
protecting reputations for candor and integrity in securities disclosure. Likewise, more
frequent mergers among professional service firms—now common among law firms—
reduces bonding value.143
Behavioral psychology contributes further explanations for why gatekeepers
depart from the rationality-based assumptions of reputational constraints against
misbehavior. First, gatekeepers may succumb to biases and use heuristics that prevent
exercising best judgment.144 Among numerous examples are the self-serving bias and the
commitment bias, which can afflict auditors, lawyers and other gatekeepers.145 The first
refers to a tendency to interpret data and assess uncertainty according to one’s own selfinterest. The second refers to a tendency to continue to believe positions one already has
taken, which can induce continued confidence in mistaken beliefs instead of correcting
them using new information.
Structural devices can address such biases. For auditors, self-serving bias can be
neutralized by reposing auditor supervision in audit committees and commitment bias by
rotating audit partners through different auditing engagements.146 Harder to combat are
more general behavioral biases known as “backward recursion” and the “time delay
trap.”147 These biases incline people to discount the significance of future events or
142
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circumstances, even those posing high magnitude consequences, and to value instant
gratification at higher levels than equal measures of deferred gratification.148
While all of the foregoing systemic factors contribute partial explanations for
gatekeeper failure, associated analysis and reforms tend to revolve around the scholarly
literature’s enduring focus on reputation constraints plus liability risk.149 These systemic
factors are taken to explain why reputation assumes lesser importance in certain market
environments.150 Reforms tend to focus either on reinvestment in reputations or
enhanced litigation threats. An important oversight in such a framework is how liability
risk can induce gatekeepers to invest, not in reputations for effectiveness, but in
campaigns to limit or eliminate the scope and type of their undertakings.
Examples of how increased litigation risk results in gatekeeper pushback include
(a) for auditors, resisting any undertaking to opine on the reasonableness of accounting
principles that management selects or to detect for fraud; and (b) for lawyers, resisting
any duty to conduct due diligence or to opine on disclosure integrity to constituents other
than a client’s board of directors (or, in some circumstances, a securities underwriter).151
In each case, a Catch 22 appears: without litigation risk, gatekeepers acquiesce but with
it, they want limited responsibilities. While a system reliant on reputation and litigation
risk cannot unwind this conundrum, adding a carrot-based merit component to the system
might help.
III. INCENTIVE REWARDS
This Part explores how developing positive incentives or rewards can promote
more effective capital market gatekeeping. Section A outlines the intuition and sketches
a formal general model. Section B considers practical steps required to implement such
rewards. This emphasizes and illustrates private arrangements that can be designed to
adjust existing incentives. Section C turns to how public recognition can contribute
additional incentives at very low cost.
A. General Model
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This section outlines a general model of incentives for gatekeepers. It begins with
the intuitive motivation followed by an account of the model under assumptions of
rationality and then under assumptions of behavioral economics.
1. Intuition — Popular corporate governance strategies include incentives
designed to align principal-agent interests.152 The most conspicuous of these are
executive compensation packages tied to corporate performance.153 Stock options are the
most common form of these incentives. They epitomize the intuition behind any merit
system: stock options give managers incentives to increase stock price. Critics debate the
effectiveness of these devices, however, with some asserting that they overreach by
tempting managers to provide misleading reporting to inflate stock price artificially.154
If the benefits of stock options are real, as devotees contend, similar benefits
should accrue from awarding analogous options to gatekeepers. If the deleterious effects
of stock options are real, as critics claim, an ideal response is to offer countervailing
incentives to gatekeepers to neutralize those effects. If risk of misleading reporting
increases in tandem with stock-based compensation, a precise antidote is merit-based
gatekeeping to offset that increase.
The intuition is akin to a hypothetical model of incentive compensation that
Warren Buffett offered concerning investment banking services. At a symposium
discussing how boards of directors assess mergers, Mr. Buffett considered the role that
advisors play, especially investment bankers.155 Many investment bankers charge
contingent fees for merger transactions, giving them strong incentives to close a deal
even if not in the client’s interests.
To correct for this perversion, Mr. Buffett quipped as follows: “If I’m going to
pay $5 million to somebody if they give me the advice and the deal goes through, then I
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think I probably ought to pay $5 million to somebody else whose advice I listen to who
gets paid the $5 million only if the deal doesn’t go through.”156 Similarly, if shareholders
pay senior executives incentive compensation to achieve designated corporate
performance measures, they should be willing to pay gatekeepers incentive compensation
to assure that achieving them is done using fair reporting.
This intuition can be amplified by insights that Professor Painter contributed
concerning law firms in merger transactions.157 Some law firms also use contingent
compensation arrangements, sometimes with disastrous consequences for shareholders of
their clients. Professor Painter instances a $35 million contingent fee that Time-Warner
Co. paid to a law firm upon the closing of its merger with America-On-Line (AOL).158
The price Time-Warner paid for AOL in that merger was exorbitant and wound up
costing its shareholders some $200 billion in investment value.159 As with Mr. Buffett’s
quip about bankers, Time-Warner shareholders would likely have benefited if the
company paid one law firm $35 million if the deal closed and another firm $35 million if
it did not.
This example furnishes additional intuitive support favoring an incentives
program for gatekeepers. Enterprises can promote effective gatekeeping by deploying
two teams of lawyers rather than one. Moreover, to correct this problem, Professor
Painter advocated banning lawyer contingent fees in corporate transactions.160 This
sensible proposal is akin to existing bans against auditors from charging clients
contingent fees.161 The rationale is to impair managerial power to bribe gatekeepers into
complicity.
An additional step could strengthen gatekeeper effectiveness. It would provide
for contingent fees for gatekeepers (auditors or lawyers) who discover and correct misreporting under circumstances when they otherwise had no legal obligation to do so.
This would not require amending the ban on auditors charging contingent fees or
interfere with imposing one on transactional lawyers.162 Auditors (and lawyers) would
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still charge fees for professional services as under current practice. They would also earn
additional fees upon discovery of errors or irregularities not otherwise within their
existing responsibilities to uncover or disclose.163
An incentives program can respond to some of the diagnoses of gatekeeper failure
noted earlier in this Article. First, it generally is agreed that wide-scale marketing of
consulting services by auditors gives managers considerable power over them.164 Firing
an auditor for being tough is a red flag to the market, but firing an auditor from its nonaudit services is not. Managers offered a carrot while holding out a stick: a favorable
audit in exchange for lucrative consulting assignments. Auditors in the consulting
business may have offered favorably lax audits to generate more assignments.165 As
Professor Coffee says, “the carrot works better than the stick, precisely because the threat
to take the carrot away [can be] more credible.”166
This insight suggests inverting the policy experience. If auditors who are paid
bonuses to do consulting work became more lax on audits, then paying them bonuses for
fraud detection and discovery should improve audit effectiveness. During the 1990s,
firms adopted the business model that rewarded audit partners for generating consulting
work. It should be attractive to let firms adopt the business model that rewards audit
partners for generating fraud-detection work. This would provide additional
compensation for success in performing a watchdog function in addition to the existing
regime that imposes liability risks.
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Second, a common diagnosis of the reputational constraint failure is how a firm’s
and a partner’s incentives may differ.167 Professor Coffee responds that, while plausible,
this diagnosis is incomplete. If a firm really sought to protect its reputation, then it would
control those persons through mandatory rotation of assignments or by imposing caps on
non-audit revenue they could earn.168 This response, which seems correct, also
contributes to the intuitive case for creating gatekeeper incentives. If firms wished to
pursue the ends as Professor Coffee hypothesizes, then an internal merit system, such as
awarding points or compensation for fraud detection, should be attractive.
Third, the standard conception of auditor reputation emphasizes investor
assessment of auditor integrity—a conception that applies equally to other gatekeepers.169
So viewed, carrots play no obvious role—integrity reflects a “disclose if detected”
approach. But if one emphasizes a gatekeeper’s reputation with management for
toughness, carrots become more obvious tools. Given the inherent limits that gatekeepers
face in testing the veracity of managerial assertions, reducing mis-reporting requires
managers to believe that gatekeepers are ruthless. That reputation can be enhanced by
rewarding them for successful detection and correction of mis-reporting.
Finally, some believe that lawyers who were paid in equity securities of clients
suffered impaired judgment as a result.170 This can be akin to the downside of
compensating managers using stock options. While both tools can tend to align the
interests of the gatekeepers/agents with those of the principal, they also can overreach
and induce acquiescence in mis-reporting. This likewise suggests inverting the
experience. Instead of compensating gatekeepers in client equity securities, positive
incentives should be offered in cash and paid as bonuses for discovering mis-reporting.
2. The Model Under Rationality Assumptions — A basic formal model of
gatekeeper decision-making compares the gains from acquiescence to the expected costs
of inculpation. An incentives program adds gains from vetogating to the model, which
must be sufficient to tip the balance for both firms and individuals. The following
discussion presents a general model of this calculus, divided into three sub-parts: (a) a
cost-benefit calculus; (b) estimating optimal gatekeeper payoffs; and (c) some alternative
approaches and variations for specific situations. The discussion in this section proceeds
on the assumption of economic rationality among actors; the next section considers the
model under behavioral assumptions.
a. Cost-Benefit Calculus.
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Professor Kraakman’s original formulation of the gatekeeping model identifies
effective gatekeepers as those with incentives that differ from clients in that they have
“less to gain and more to lose” from granting capital market access to clients who misreport.171 Gatekeepers stand to the value of the bribe and stand to lose reputation value
and liability costs. Neglected in this and kindred formulations is what gatekeepers have
to gain from turning the petitioner away—true, they have to gain a good reputation with
instrumental value. But just as the one side of the equation emphasizes “more to lose” in
both reputation impairment and legal liability and the other side emphasizes “less to
gain” from complicity, the formula should also emphasize “more to gain” from
disruption.
A simple fact pattern illustrates. In connection with a pending transaction, a
corporate employee commits fraud (say booking false revenues). Gatekeepers participate
in generating related documentation (say investment bankers draft, auditors certify and
lawyers conform in disclosure documents). The gatekeepers have duties in respect of the
transaction and also opportunities apart from those duties to become aware of the fraud.
For each, gatekeepers must decide whether to perform their duties (and, if they discover
anything, to correct, disclose or withdraw) and whether to perform additional tasks, not
otherwise required, that may uncover it (and then face the same set of alternative
decisions).
In each case, a complex set of costs and benefits appear. Benefits of complicity at
each step include fees from the pending transaction, the present value of probable future
fees from other transactions, and any slice of the fraud such as bribes to acquiesce. Costs
of complicity include the discounted probability of inculpation. Following most
gatekeeper theory, the gatekeepers wish to preserve and promote a reputation for veracity
and thoroughness and thus see complicity as posing a potential cost in reputation. In
some cases, the gatekeeper may prefer a reputation for complicity and thus make the
opposite calculation.172 Setting those latter cases aside for the moment, the following
formulation captures the elements of these decisions:173
BF < > P[d] * { ( P[e] * L[l] ) + L[r] }
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where:
BF = benefits from fraud (of complicity in mis-reporting)
P[d] = probability of detection
P[e] = probability of enforcement
L[1] = legal liability
L[r] = reputation damage.
This formula expresses the relationship between the benefits of complicity on the
left hand and the costs of inculpation on the right. It captures how rational actors will
facilitate mis-reporting when the benefits from fraud, BF, exceed expected total costs.
Expected total costs depend initially on the probability of detection, P[d]. Assuming
detection occurs, then expected legal liability is the product of the probability of
successful enforcement, P[e], and associated legal liability if so, L[1]. Expected total
costs add reputation damage, L[r], to that result.
Recall how assessments in the literature, including diagnoses of the Enron era,
highlight mis-aligned incentives and under-deterrence from inadequate liability risk.174
The foregoing formula captures these, respectively, in the magnitude of the benefits from
fraud (complicity in mis-reporting), BF, and the magnitude of legal liability, L[1]. The
mis-aligned incentives thesis as applied to gatekeepers supposes that BF was too high
compared to L[r] and the legal liability thesis supposes that L[1] was too low compared
to the optimal level.
Recall also how the literature has said little about incentive compensation from
disrupting mis-reporting. The literature concentrates almost entirely on the mis-aligned
incentives and legal liability theses. If carrots were added, the gatekeeper’s decision
would include weighing the payoff that she would earn from disrupting mis-reporting. In
the formula, this means adding a new variable to the right side to capture this gatekeeper
payoff, as follows:
BF < > P[d] * {(P[e] * L[l]) + L[r]} + GP
where
GP = gatekeeper payoff from effective gatekeeping (i.e., incentive payments received for
disrupting mis-reporting).
For convenience, in the ensuing discussion, the components of this expanded
formula will be referred to as follows: GP for these newly-added gatekeeper payoffs, BF
for the benefits of mis-reporting and TC for the total expected costs of inculpation [P[d]
* {(P[e] * L[l]) + L[r]}].
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b. Optimal Gatekeeper Payoffs.
The level of gatekeeper payoffs (GP) must be sufficient so that the benefits of
mis-reporting are less than the sum of the total costs of inculpation plus gatekeeper
payoffs frrm effective gatekeeping. In the formula’s terms, GP must exceed BF – TC (so
that BF < TC + GP).
The required gatekeeper payoff (the amount of GP) will vary with attributes of
different professions, functions and environments. But to offer a sense of the parameters,
it should be possible to hazard reasonable theoretical approximations of minimum and
maximum levels. The minimum GP might be approximated by reference to a deciding
agent’s opportunity cost—a portion of BF. A maximum level might be approximated by
reference to the next best deterrence strategy. Appreciating that these are analytical and
illustrative rather than scientific or definitive, consider each in detail.
As to approximating the minimum gatekeeper payoff (GP), gatekeeping firms
should compensate members to motivate them to build the firm’s long-term reputation
but, for firms, retention requires meeting employee opportunity costs.175 A professional’s
opportunity costs—gains available from the next best option—are determined largely by
the managers with whom she regularly interacts, meaning clients, whose assessments of a
professional’s reputation is significant (for example, they will be asked to provide
references should the professional later seek new employment). This can put her
allegiances with those persons, not with her firm. This increases the firms costs of
monitoring her clients. To neutralize this, a minimum GP would be that amount
necessary to bond the professional’s interests to the firm’s long-term reputation. In this
approximation, that is the amount of those opportunity costs.
As to approximating the maximum gatekeeping payoff (GP), it must be no greater
than the next best alternative strategy (if it were greater, then the alternative would be
superior). For illustration, among candidates for the next best deterrence strategy is a
legal regime that imposes vicarious personal liability on partners of the deciding actor’s
firm. Partner X is liable for violations of Partner Y. This increases incentives that Partner
X has to monitor Partner Y. But as Professor Ribstein explains, “this liability may be
ineffective because it places risk on those who are ill-situated to prevent harm.”176 Thus,
such a system of negative threats may create excessive incentives for internal monitoring
and yet remain ineffective.
As a next-best strategy, the alternative can be used to approximate a maximum
level of gatekeeper payoff (GP). Using incentive contracts, Partner Y earns rewards that
reduce the need for Partner X to monitor Partner Y. Rather than impose vicarious
liability on Partner X for “wrongs” of Partner Y, the program awards Partner Y bonuses
for “rights” that reduce Partner X’s need to monitor Partner Y. The maximum GP, then,
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would be the cost to Partner X of engaging in such oversight (again, if GP were more
than that, the vicarious deterrence alternative would be superior).177
c. Other Approaches and Specifications.
Other avenues for estimating the parameters or ranges of optimal gatekeeper
payoffs (GP) are possible. I provide the foregoing examples to suggest the model’s
feasibility rather than to delineate it completely. In the same vein, it may be useful to
consider alternatives to the existing stick-oriented gatekeeper regime and examples of
specifications that may be useful in developing an incentives program.
As to approaches other than adding incentives for gatekeepers, some critics
lament the limitations on the reputational constraint—manifested by the discrete and
cumulative failures of private gatekeeping. They prescribe displacing it altogether in
favor of an emboldened public enforcement program through a strengthened SEC.178
This is extreme because it removes other benefits of the private gatekeeping model,
which is far less intrusive than would be an SEC or other purely public model.179
Perhaps it is a superior policy prescription. It is intended to increase the expected total
costs of inculpation (TC) through regulatory empowerment. Yet it may be more prudent
to continue to work with the existing model by adding gains from gatekeeping (GP)
before taking such a radical move. It addresses the misaligned incentives problem by
offering short-term personal gain not to be in on the fraud.
Another alternative to adding gatekeeper payoff incentives is to manipulate the
expected total costs of inculpation (TC) using devices other than cash. Professor
McGowan proposed that securities lawyers who are first to disrupt mis-reporting be
rewarded with transactional immunity from any related prosecution.180 This is a valuable
contribution to the literature. Yet it is a narrow change: it applies only to lawyers for a
limited whistle-blowing function and provides the carrot of lenity (which may be
perceived as a lighter stick than a carrot). This Article is exploring a broader model for
use by all gatekeepers and contemplates paying cash (and providing other forms of public
recognition as noted in the next section).
This exploration is thus more general, which means that the foregoing model
requires specification for particular applications. First, it requires specification according
to the professional identify of different gatekeepers. What works for auditors may not
work for lawyers. An important issue is how to interpret the reputational constraint. For
177
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auditors, all seem to agree that enforcement and compelling disclosure increase
reputation value whereas, for lawyers, scholars debate whether a reputation for
complicity is more valuable than one for probity.181 In the foregoing model, this
difference between auditors and lawyers concerns whether to locate reputation, [r], on
the left or right side of the formula. While [r]’s location influences the required amount
of gatekeeper payoffs (GP), explicitly adding that variable to the calculus is useful under
either assumption.
An incentives program requires specification for variations among gatekeepers
and whistleblowers (and hybrids). As traditionally defined, gatekeepers are present to
prevent access to capital markets or to correct mis-reporting before granting access.182
They bear duties to do so and may be more often exposed to bribes for complicity.
Whistleblowers traditionally report after a violation has occurred and a party has passed
through the gate and accessed capital markets.183 Whistle-blowers often do not have
duties to report so those engaged in mis-reporting may be less conscious of the value of
offering bribes to them. Accordingly, relationships between benefits of complicity and
costs of inculpation vary as between gatekeepers and whistleblowers (and hybrids). These
differences do not alter the basic relationships between benefits and costs in the general
model but would require specification for particular applications.
3. The Model Under Behavioral Assumptions — Turn from the rational costbenefit calculus to some critiques from behavioral economics. Professor Prentice
identifies two important behavioral limitations on the reputational constraint: backward
recursion and a time delay trap. Both limitations can be neutralized using the right
positive incentives.184
First, consider backward recursion, where short-term returns from dishonesty
dwarf future benefits from honesty.185 This problem is acute in certain settings, including
end-game contexts (say, a person near retirement or a firm near dissolution), internal
principal-agent contexts (where a firm’s reputation counts but an individual member gets
little benefit from it), or when gains to individuals exceed probable future losses or
through mis-estimation of any of these and related penalties.186
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While an incentives program may not eliminate these biases—especially the risk
of mis-estimation—it help to counteract them.187 It would increase the short-term returns
from honesty. It can surgically respond to settings where risks of backward recursion are
acute. For end-games, it increases retirement resources and firm solvency; it closes the
reputation gap that arises from mis-aligned incentives. If gatekeeper payoffs (PF) are
sufficiently large relative to the difference between benefits from complicity (BF) and
expected costs of inculpation (TC), positive incentives can reduce the risk of misestimation.
Second, gatekeepers may suffer from a time-delay trap.188 The trap arises when
people over-value instant gratification.189 Gatekeepers may under-appreciate the longterm effects of building a reputation, which may take years, delaying gratification.190 This
condition manifests in improper activities promising immediate payoffs if either detection
is unlikely in the long-term or the long-term is sufficiently distant to be discounted into
immateriality. Self-serving bias can exacerbate this condition when people assess
information supporting self-interest, as by rationalizing fraudulent schemes. Carrots
counteract these biases. Cash paid today offset the discounting effect by providing
gatekeepers immediate rewards. Cash compensates gatekeepers for not being in on a
scheme, reducing the likelihood that they will overlook the long-term risks of liability.
Professor Painter notes that regulations do little to address cognitive biases
gatekeepers may face.191 As examples, commitment bias can induce auditors to hide postreporting discoveries or induce lawyers to adhere to previous assessments of the
probability of litigation outcomes despite new information tending to contradict the
assessment.192 The resulting biased judgments can infect related disclosure. Among
solutions to such problems are to use audit committees as auditor supervisors, as required
by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, or to obtain a second lawyers’ opinion (an option but not a
regulatory requirement). Neither solution is perfect or complete—adding an incentives
program can reduce the imperfections further.193
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B. Private Arrangements
If the intuition and formal general model are potentially appealing conceptually, it
remains to consider practical steps necessary to implement it. The following discussion
considers private arrangements, for lawyers and auditors, surveying services that an
incentive program might encompass and sketching some parameters of how private
contractual arrangements can be designed to fund and execute them.
1. Services — Rewards concentrate on functions that would be productive for
gatekeepers to perform, although not otherwise required by law. This category can be
large and exists, in part, because of gatekeepers’ reluctance to accept categorical
exposure to liability for undertaking associated functions. The following illustrates some
services that the program could encompass. It classifies them for convenience into two
categories: investigation and certification. Examples of each are provided for both
lawyers and auditors.
a. Investigation
For lawyers, a good illustration of investigation services concerns due diligence
exercises. Law permits, but does not require, lawyers to perform due diligence in
numerous capital market transactions, from underwritten public offerings to change of
control arrangements. Lawyers conduct due diligence because performance creates a
defense against securities law liability.194 Failure to perform, or failure to discover
problems and disrupt access to capital markets, does not, ipso facto, expose lawyers to
liability.195 However, lawyers are component to perform the exercise and sometimes are
expressly retained to do so, as where an enterprise detects for specific misconduct that
has come to its board’s attention.196
For auditors, a good illustration of investigation services concerns fraud detection.
Auditors conduct full-scale audits of clients but are not strictly obligated to detect for
Years of Evidence, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 849 (1997); Larry E. Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 77
(2003).
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fraud.197 Failure to discover fraud does not, in itself, expose auditors to legal liability.
Professional auditing standards articulate a modest measure of obligation to detect for
fraud, but its exact scope as a matter of law is contested and uncertain.198 As a result, its
execution in practice is limited.199 Auditors prefer to deny having any duties that would
flow from a broad interpretation of the standard.200 Nevertheless, auditors sometimes
assume express contractual duties to investigate for fraud, such as when they are engaged
to conduct forensic audits.201 Auditors actively promote the value of this service.202 As
with lawyers who undertake contractual duties to conduct due diligence, this signals that
auditors command the professional skills and ingenuity required to perform this service.
b. Certification
Written legal opinions are examples of certification services that lawyers provide.
Lawyers often provide these to clients for various securities-related matters, and
sometimes prepare them for others at a client’s request.203 A common context occurs
when an underwriting agreement conditions the underwriter’s duty on receiving an
197
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opinion from issuer’s counsel concerning the legality of the transaction and compliance,
as to form, with federal securities regulations.
Lawyers’ opinions tend to be narrowly drawn and addressed. They invariably
provide “negative assurance.”204 The opinion states that the firm conducted investigations
it deemed necessary and that nothing came to its attention that would prevent it from
opining that the transaction is lawful and disclosure in conformity with regulations.205
Reliance is expressly limited to addressees, usually a client’s board of directors (or,
sometimes, an underwriting firm of a client’s securities). Apart from contractual
requirements and modest risk of liability such as negligent misrepresentation, failure to
provide an opinion does not expose a firm to legal liability or even reputational
damage.206
Written comfort letters are examples of certification services that auditors
provide. In securities underwriting, an underwriter’s obligations are conditioned on
receipt of a designated comfort letter from the issuer’s auditors. As with lawyers’
opinions, these provide negative assurance and do not require the auditor to conduct any
particular investigation.207 In present practice, evidence suggests that auditors expressly
disclaim any specific responsibility for detecting fraud, echoing the profession’s more
general aversion to accepting such duties.208
c. Why Law Does Not Mandate these Services
Law could require that gatekeepers render investigation and certification services
of the kind just described. It could mandate that lawyers perform due diligence in
securities transactions and provide formal written certifications to designated transaction
participants, including investors.209 It could require that those certifications state
204
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affirmatively that disclosure is fair and accurate in all material respects. Law could
clarify that auditors are responsible for detecting fraud and require that they provide
specific positive assurance to underwriters or other transaction participants. But law has
not done so and probably for good reasons.
First, such blanket mandates may demand more than is necessary. Not all
enterprises require comprehensive gatekeeper vetting.210 Second, that might demand
more than is possible. Fraud and other sources of mis-reporting can be hidden in ways
that no professional could discover.211 Risks of error can be so high that the expected
costs to the professionals exceed the price that they could charge for backstopping their
opinions. As a result, the professions resist accepting such duties as a political matter.212
This implies, however, that the threat of legal liability can backfire. Auditors and
lawyers have a comparative advantage to investigate and certify yet, under the existing
regime, these services may be rendered on sub-optimal terms.213 Designing a system in
which auditors and lawyers would agree to perform these functions—without fear of
legal liability—is thus appealing.
2. Contracts. Contracts are useful devices to induce gatekeepers to render
investigation and certification services. The following discussion presents some
requirements to promote contract effectiveness, evaluates possible contractual
arrangements and incentives and notes the risk of creating excess incentives.
a. Requirements
Effective contracting to make a positive incentives program useful probably
requires at least the following attributes. First, the program’s strength depends on
generating and channeling sufficient funds to gatekeepers.214 Compensation must be
sufficient to fund an optimal level of gatekeeper payoffs (GP). The challenge is finding
the funding. Ideally, funds would draw on resources that already exist in the capital
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formation process. One possibility, discussed below, is contractual reallocation of deal
cash flows, chiefly from issuers and underwriters to auditors and lawyers.
Second, the program should satisfy the requirements of a signaling equilibrium.
The strength depends, in part, on dissemination of information about it to capital market
participants.215 The contracts provide signals to market participants; enterprises giving
gatekeepers incentives to disrupt mis-reporting should benefit from lower costs of capital
compared to those unwilling to do so.216 Signals work when the cost of signaling varies
inversely with actual quality (i.e., it costs more for lower quality actors to signal; if it
were cheaper to do so, everyone would signal and the value would plummet).217 An
incentives program would satisfy this condition because it would impose costs on low
quality signalers that they would be unwilling to pay.
Third, all incentive-based exercises that gatekeepers undertake would be
optional. Services that gatekeepers are otherwise legally required to perform are outside
its scope. This triggers a related final requirement that judicial interpretation of resulting
agreements should be strict. A law or auditing firm that expressly agrees to examine an
enterprise to uncover mis-reporting but fails to do so should not face liability if the
express terms of the contract do not carry any guarantee of performance. Litigation risk
must not be so high that the expected liability costs of undertaking the optional functions
exceeds the fair market contract price for undertaking them.
b. Modifying Present Practice
Modest modification to present practice would enable implementing positive
gatekeeper incentives meeting the foregoing requirements. The following is intended to
illustrate one context in which this could work—without meaning to be exhaustive.218
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Take the examples given in Section III.B.1 concerning lawyers’ opinion letters and
auditors’ comfort letters. Both are products of underwriting agreements and reflect that
those professionals conducted investigations they deemed necessary and nothing came to
their attention to prevent providing the certification. The professionals earn their fee as a
result, in accordance with their retention or engagement agreements with issuers.
Under positive incentive contracts, in contrast, the professionals would agree with
issuers to undertake the investigative functions and earn compensation to the extent, and
only to the extent, that the investigation results in discoveries of mis-reporting. The
important negotiated provisions would address compensation, delineate the activities or
discoveries that generate it, and verification measures. In the best scenarios, those
discoveries would result in correction and still enable the issuer to access capital markets;
but the gatekeepers would also be paid in cases where their discoveries led to denying
that access. All participants in the transaction—underwriters, issuers, auditors and
lawyers—have incentives to enter in these arrangements.
For underwriters, several incentives to modify existing arrangements in favor of
this kind of program. First, the program need not replace the existing conditions set forth
in underwriting agreements that generate negative assurance. Second, underwriters are
gatekeepers too and face reputation and liability constraints elaborated in the traditional
gatekeeping model. They can protect reputation and reduce liability risk by increasing the
effectiveness of their fellow gatekeepers. Current evidence indicates that underwriters are
seeking to have auditors perform such functions but auditors are unwilling to do so.219 An
incentives program can break the resulting stalemate. Accordingly, it should be desirable,
in principle, for underwriters to agree with issuers to create optional opportunities for
their fellow gatekeepers to actively seek to discover and correct mis-reporting.
Most issuers should find this strategy attractive. True, enterprises that are
institutionally dedicated to mis-reporting would find the proposal repellant. But the
resulting differentiation among issuers creates the required signaling equilibrium to
increase the program’s strength. For investors, this would separate enterprises according
to the relative probability that their reporting is fair compared to misleading.220
Furthermore, while difficult to verify empirically, it does not seem common for
entire enterprises to be institutionally dedicated to mis-reporting; more commonly,
individual agents within an enterprise wish to mis-report. In either case, the reforms made
in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act create internal governance structures associated with boards of
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directors that can be useful.221 Willingness to adapt arrangements to implement one likely
would have to originate with an issuer’s board of directors, although it is not impossible
to believe that senior executives would find it attractive, so long as they are not among an
inner circle committed to deception.222
Within issuers, audit committees should support gatekeeper incentives and be able
to develop them. Many believe that the most important of the changes in the SarbanesOxley Act is audit committee power over auditors.223 The law reposes in audit
committees the power to select, compensate, supervise and terminate auditors, as well
more power over the selection of appropriate accounting principles through a formal role
in resolving disagreements between management and auditors and expressly empowering
audit committees to retain independent counsel and other advisors.224 Audit committees
now wield considerable influence in the audit function and easily could develop incentive
contracts and other programs to promote effective gatekeeping, by both auditors and
lawyers.
For audit committees who believe that the rewards approach is conceptually
appealing in principle, this aspiration can be stated expressly as part of the audit
committee’s charter. To the extent that the issuer assumes responsibility to fund bonus
compensation that lawyers or auditors earn in the exercise, they should be able to
command requisite resources internally from the enterprise under the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act’s provisions requiring that issuers give audit committees a sufficient budget.225
Committees can argue, credibly, that associated costs will be vastly outweighed by saving
the costs of later-discovered mis-reporting.
The issuer would not have to fund 100% of the awards. Award funding would be
subject to negotiation between the issuer and underwriter. The issuer could agree to pay
all bonus compensation or the issuer and underwriter could agree to share designated
portions. Funding a portion of the payout will be appealing to the underwriter according
221
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to its calculations, under the traditional gatekeeping model, of reputation and liability
costs that result from later-discovered mis-reporting.
Triggers for the awards would likewise be subject to negotiation. They would
specify threshold levels necessary to earn compensation and specify kinds of error or
irregularity that are included and excluded. Parameters would reflect the difference
between activities that a gatekeeper is otherwise obligated to perform under existing law
and those that it is voluntarily undertaking to perform contractually. In delineating these
boundaries in the underwriting agreement, all participants would contribute to
negotiations—issuers and underwriters as well as auditors and lawyers.
Resulting incentives should make this approach enticing to auditors and lawyers.
Auditing and law firms could increase its appeal and effectiveness by designing internal
compensation systems through which the contingency payments for discovery are
channeled to appropriate personnel. Among other contributions, this would facilitate the
prescription, noted earlier, to create mechanisms that support channeling negative
information through a chain of reporting.226
The philosophical aspects of a positive incentives program could be reflected
within such firms in compensation systems. At present, audit firm partner compensation
is tied to generating revenues from consulting or auditing work and, since the SarbanesOxley Act was passed, on designing and testing systems of internal control. The Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) encourages firms to allocate resources
and compensation to functions designed to improve auditors’ technical competence.227
Without diminishing the importance of these ways of allocating resources, sufficient
flexibility appears that would enable compensation systems to channel gains from
effective gatekeeping to responsible partners. The same should be true of law firms.
c. Risk of Excess Incentives
Contracts designed to create incentives for effective gatekeeping require attention
to the (ironic) risk that gatekeepers will fabricate mis-reporting to obtain additional
compensation. As a theoretical matter, this risk also exists in the current reputation-andliability model of gatekeeping. Auditor reputations increase in value by repeated
demonstrations of integrity, whether this is achieved by detecting and correcting misreporting or more public statements such as resigning from an engagement. That can
create a strategic temptation to be too strict on clients.
Similar strategic mis-fires could arise under incentive programs. To police for
such temptations in this context, contracts would specify not only the kinds of discoveries
that generate compensation, but also provide for a verification procedure. For payments
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by issuers to gatekeepers, audit committees can perform this function; in the case of
gatekeeper firm payments to internal personnel, verification committees could be
established. In general, however, it should be easier to detect fraud about fraud than
fraud itself.
3. Teams — To expand the specific illustrations just given of how contracts can
be designed to create positive incentives, consider a broader framework involving the use
of teams in the gatekeeping setting. Traditionally, enterprises retain one law firm and
engage one auditing firm in securities transactions and often, especially for law firms,
they dispatch a single team of experts who work together on the matter. Commonly,
another enterprise participating in the transaction likewise hires and dispatches lawyers
and auditors (as with counterparties in a business combination or financing arrangement).
These traditional approaches could be adjusted. For example, as Professor Coffee
has explored heuristically, an enterprise could engage two separate teams of lawyers for a
matter or retain a single law firm, but have it dispatch two separate teams.228 This
construct reflects the dual role that lawyers play in such contexts, serving as both
advocates and advisors to the enterprise on the one hand and a public gatekeeping
function on the other. Tensions result. Using two firms or teams can enable segregating
these functions so that each can discharge professional responsibilities without ethical
dissonance. While so deploying two teams can be expensive and redundant, the notion
should not be dismissed.
First, auditors functionally deploy the equivalent of two teams to work on a single
engagement. Audit firms dispatch engagement teams to work on particular audits, but
these must report to and interact with partners and other teams in the firms’ national
offices. The national office is functionally equivalent to an incentives-driven supervisory
team. Using incentives, either team would be more willing to deploy more rigorous
auditing techniques, as where teams may elect to perform the more rigorous testing
required in forensic audits than in traditional financial statement auditing.
This auditing practice of using an engagement team subject to national office
supervision has a parallel in the organization of some large corporate law firms. They
maintain internal policies that subject individual retentions to internal review. Examples
include having a committee of partners review new clients and obtaining second- or
third- partner review of firm opinions on certain matters before issuing them. The New
York law firm of White & Case famously implemented these structures in its agreement
settling charges arising from its role in the notorious National Student Marketing fraud of
the 1970s.229
Second, among lawyers, there invariably are two teams on cooperative
transactions—usually from different law firms. In securities offerings, both underwriter’s
228
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and issuer’s counsel participate in due diligence exercises designed to enable preparing
fair disclosure in the prospectus. In business combinations, each side, buyer and seller,
retains lawyers to negotiate the governing agreements, along with voluminous disclosure
schedules, on the basis of respective due diligence investigations. Likewise, both sides’
lawyers often prepare opinions in those transactions. While both sides seek to protect
their own client’s position, they are most effective when generating maximum gains from
the transaction—creating value, not just claiming it.230
In transactions with two teams, it should be possible to design assignment and
compensation contracts that, while facilitating meeting professional responsibilities, also
enable promoting lawyers’ role as gatekeepers. The ideal would be contracts in which
one team is designated as the closing team whose mission is to accomplish the transaction
and the other is the gatekeeping team whose assignment is to perform due diligence and
certification functions. The closing team can be compensated conventionally, as based on
billable hours, while the gatekeeping team can be compensated according to a base rate
plus contingent bonuses in respect of discovered mis-reporting (whether or not
corrected). Addressing the specific professional responsibilities may be difficult, but the
example suggests the vitality of Professor Coffee’s heuristic.
Third, enlisting and designating two separate legal or audit teams for a transaction
copes with increased complicity risks when individuals and teams within a gatekeeper or
among different gatekeepers are capable of conspiring. This is an important insight
accompanying Professor McGowan’s proposal to offer immunity to lawyers who disrupt
mis-reporting: creating incentives to do so weakens the capacity to conspire.231 Effective
deal-making requires that participants cooperate to a large extent; this capacity must be
preserved. A good way to do so is to dispatch two teams with designated assignments,
each of which would be cooperative to the end of (a) closing a transaction while (b) using
fair reporting. Each would have incentives that contribute to promoting that twin result.
The dual-team approach reflects the insights from Mr. Buffett’s and Professor
Painter’s bilateral professional service retention models.232 Two teams facing different
incentives will be inclined to exert pressure against each other. Mis-reporting temptations
by the closing team are offset by opposite incentives of the gatekeeping team;
temptations to overzealousness among the gatekeeping team are constrained by contrary
incentives of the closing team.233
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C. Public Recognition
Apart from cash compensation channeled by contract to effective gatekeepers and
team design, a broader range of public recognition could form part of a carrot system to
supplement the traditional gatekeeping model. A proposal to provide public recognition
raises and requires addressing several additional issues. These are cultural challenges to
implementing the system, the relation of compensation to professional morality and the
potential that public recognition could create excessive incentives among gatekeepers to
exercise gatekeeping prerogatives.
1. Culture — Effective gatekeeping relies not only on the conditions of reputation
and liability threats but on broader cultural foundations that make those stimuli
function.234 In contemporary culture, media, regulators and scholars concentrate on
persons who failed to perform their functions. These persons or firms are “shamed” in the
press, face liability at the hands of authorities, and are given analytical attention by
scholars inquiring into diagnostics that can yield normative policy implications.235 Much
rarer are media, regulatory or scholarly attention on those gatekeepers who perform their
functions successfully. For this reason alone, a merit system should have some appeal to
highlight the degree to which gatekeeping is effective.
In contrast, such public recognition is showered on “heroes” who, after the fact,
exercise authority to prosecute the villains. Consider Elliot Spitzer. As Attorney General
of the State of New York, he earned public “hero” status for his enforcement of laws in a
wide range of contexts in the post-bubble fallout.236 That status, in turn, played a
significant role in his subsequent election as Governor of that State. True, private
whistleblowers such as Sharron Watkins of Enron shared in some of the limelight, but
even then received mixed reviews, in part for emerging long after the scandal had
incubated.237 Hero status is not conferred on gatekeepers or others who disrupt misreporting and correct it because their effectiveness is not normally publicly disclosed.
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Consider a more proactive strategy of public recognition. Unlike with
gatekeeping contracts or team structure components of incentive programs, public
recognition does not necessarily require cash (or at least not large amounts).238 A good
model of public recognition are the Malcom Baldridge National Quality Awards, named
for a US Commerce Secretary and awarded annually since 1988 to US innovators who
demonstrate exemplary leadership in designated performance categories.239 For capital
market gatekeeping, the SEC or PCAOB could adapt this honor to recognize an Auditor
of the Year or Lawyer of the Year for successful disruption of mis-reporting. It is more
socially valuable to make heroes out of auditors and securities lawyers ex ante than of
prosecutors (or plaintiffs’ lawyers) ex post.
The parameters of systematic formal public recognition must be drawn carefully.
This is necessary to appreciate a more general potential obstacle to paying rewards to
effective gatekeepers: a traditional cultural aversion to ratting in the United States.240
This aversion arises from how competing values such as loyalty and trust are
implicated.241 These can be in tension with whistle-blowing or gatekeeping, which are
forms of ratting. The strength or frequency of the aversion is essentially impossible to
estimate and can certainly be overstated. Yet the existence of governmental bounty
programs (such as those of the IRS and SEC) and of qui tem actions suggest that
inducements are necessary to entice US persons to rat on fellow citizens.242
On the other hand, for capital market gatekeepers, these tensions should be more
attenuated than for other citizens. The professional status of most gatekeepers embraces
probity and integrity more compatible with disrupting mis-reporting than with loyalty in
acquiescing to it. This tendency is probably strongest for auditors, whose training and
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self-identification entails professional skepticism that is a cognate of ratting.243 The
common designation of the profession as a public watchdog bears this out.
In contrast, lawyers face conflicting values. Enlisting lawyers as capital market
watchdogs confronts the profession’s traditional advocacy model and resulting principles
of confidentiality epitomized in the attorney-client privilege.244 Lawyers have not
historically assumed a watchdog identity comparable to that of auditors. Despite that
history, some sense of a watchdog function has animated at least part of the professional
identity of the securities lawyer—as it has for other private lawyers who play a quaispublic role.245 For securities lawyers willing to accept this somewhat complex identify, a
carrot system can ease resulting tensions.
Either way, however, public recognition for such activities must be carefully
drawn to be in tune with the public’s general aversion to ratting. The “heroes” must be
portrayed in much the way that Elliott Spitzer was presented. They must be seen as
dedicated, public-minded professionals, perhaps seeking to advance their own careers—
as Spitzer certainly did—but only in a way that is consistent with the public interest—
likewise, as Spitzer did.246
2. Functions — The prevailing lack of public recognition for successful
gatekeeping may also be due to the historical emphasis on gatekeeping functions as
opposed to whistleblower functions. That is, gatekeeper models are designed to act
internally within an enterprise rather than shine the public spotlight on it. But public
recognition for successful gatekeeping obviously would alter that.
A good example occurred in the 1970s when the auditing firm of Arthur Young
blew the whistle on, and withheld support from, Lockheed Corporation amid the foreign
government bribery scandals of that era.247 Lockheed and its top managers had much to
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gain from concealing the scheme—it was criminal. But Arthur Young disrupted their
ability to do so by disrupting Lockheed’s access to capital markets. As theory would
predict and explain, in Professor Kraakman’s terms, Arthur Young had little to gain and
much to lose from complicity.248 And Arthur Young received considerable public
recognition for its refusal in the contemporary press.249
In contrast, today’s sensibilities shower less praise on effective gatekeepers and
instead tend to diagnose pathological cases for lessons about what went wrong and then
generalize from these for systemic reform.250 With that orientation, it is unsurprising that
policymakers and scholars incline toward refashioning the duties and liability strategies
in search of optimal deterrence. An alternative, less common, approach would examine
how and why things go well. Reputation and liability risks may influence a professional’s
decision-making, but more fundamental norms drive professional behavior too.251 Many
professionals who perform effectively do so to obtain satisfaction from a job well done—
not for fear of liability or damaging reputation. What should the consequences be of
doing a good job?
For many critics, it appears that doing a required job is simply the norm and doing
it well deserves no special praise. But if one condemns those who fail in their job, why
not be willing to recognize those who perform their jobs well? A more general and
affirming response to good work is recognition. This can assume many forms, from a
simple expression of gratitude (like a supervisor’s pat on the back or handwritten note)252
to a more forthright public expression of appreciation. A carrot system could envision
that kind of public recognition for disrupting mis-reporting (in addition to the form of
cash incentive programs discussed in the preceding section).
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This may raise an objection. It may appear that paying gatekeepers extra for doing
what they ought to do—whether required by law or by professional or other non-legal
commands.253 As to legal requirements, the proposal preempts this objection to avoid
problems of contract law’s pre-existing duty rule.254 The proposal envisions a program
that pays compensation or recognition for performing functions not otherwise legally
required. As to professional or other non-legal commands, the objection is harder to meet,
for it is valiant to emphasize such commands and project ethical appeals to induce
superior gatekeeping. Yet it seems more realistic to appreciate how cash and public
recognition can contribute to achieving those aspirations.
Perhaps paradoxically, cash and recognition may even be edifying vehicles to
reinforce professional principles. Consider how structural forces catalogued earlier may
have reduced gatekeeper incentives to invest in reputational capital.255 Among audit
firms, the phenomenon of cross-selling (bundling consulting assignments to auditing
engagements) changed auditing culture from professionalism to commercialism. Since
reversing culture is difficult,256 tools that work within existing culture are more promising
than those alien to it. A carrot system works within existing commercial culture by
paying people bonuses when successful as detectives. That should induce investment in
reputation despite contrary forces and that, in turn, would promote an ethical sense of
probity and integrity among those so compensated.
3. Effects — In the years after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act passed, critics complained
of what they saw as a decline in US competitiveness in global capital markets. They cited
a decrease in the frequency and size of initial public offerings in New York compared to
London and a decline in the number of public companies listed in the US.257 Implicitly,
these critics essentially argue that gatekeeping can be too effective. A carrot system, in
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this view, is the last thing these markets need. This critique invites brief remarks on the
parallel but different system of gatekeeping that appears in the legislative process.258
Certain theories of the legislative process emphasize the presence of multiple
“vetogates.” These refer to choke points in the legislative process that enable participants
to obstruct the passage of legislation.259 Examples include Congressional bicameralism,
Presidential presentment, supermajority voting (as with overriding a Presidential veto),
formal standing rules, Senatorial rules concerning filibusters and cloture, the committee
and conference reporting systems and even informal legislative mores.260 Numerous
gatekeepers participate in activating these vetogates, including the President, as well as
committee chairs, senior Senators and House members and, especially, lobbyists.261 The
result is that the vast majority of bills do not become law, a deliberate strategy designed
to minimize the risk of sub-optimal lawmaking as well as to promote confidence that law
is supported by consensus.262
Compared to the legislative process, the capital formation process is modestly
parallel yet radically different. The parallel concerns how system design contains
numerous vetogates. Consider the many opportunities to activate vetogates in a typical
securities transactions, say a public offering: hiring an underwriter to sell it; attracting
securities analysts to follow it; retaining lawyers to negotiate and document the terms and
furnish legal opinions; engaging auditors to audit financial statements (and internal
controls) and offer related comfort letters; for debt, getting a rating agency to rate it;
requesting that the SEC declare the related registration statement effective; and closing
the transaction. Without being scientific about it, there appear to be as many vetogates in
capital market transactions as there are in the legislative process.
The radical differences between vetogates in legislative processes compared to
capital market transactions concern the purpose of these devices and the orientation of
participants. Vetogates in legislative processes are intended to reduce the probability of
passing legislation and this is seen as necessary to promote the appearance and
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achievement of consensus and the effectiveness of laws.263 For securities transactions,
the cultural milieu is nearly exactly the opposite. Participants want to facilitate the deal,
to enable the financing, to form or transfer capital.
Some vocal critics of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act imply that more capital market
transactions are better and more public companies are better—they criticize the Act’s
fallout by showing proportionately fewer public offerings made in New York compared
to London and a falling number of public companies in the US.264 But becoming and
staying a public company historically were—and probably should be—badges of honor.
To sustain that designation, it should not necessarily be easier to become or continue as a
public company than it is for a bill to become law.
It is unlikely, that vetogating in capital markets would or should ever be more
common than vetogating in legislative processes. Capital market vetogates are not
discretionary in the same way they can be in the legislative process. Rather, the system
installs additional cross-checks designed to counterbalance competing incentives.
Managers who are inclined to mis-report when doing so earns lucrative gains from stock
options currently face gatekeepers whose compensation is not tied to reporting accuracy,
except through vague reputation constraints and liability risks. Tying gatekeeper
compensation to disrupting mis-reporting would neutralize contrary incentives. The
potential risk the system raises of excessive vetogating is further reduced by the
continuing presence of participants with strong incentives to get deals or audits done.
CONCLUSION
Regulatory reform and scholarly literature concerning capital market gatekeepers
have historically concentrated on penalties for failing to meet legal duties or structures to
promote investment in reputations. Imposing penalties to deter acquiescence is a natural
response, in part because acquiescent gatekeepers assume a vivid public posture amid
publicized fraud, and part because lawyers and law naturally look to liability design to
influence behavior. Penalties may be necessary to achieve optimal deterrence. Promoting
investment in reputations for integrity likewise produces a valuable contribution to
capital market integrity.
A new line of inquiry is developing that focuses on rewarding gatekeepers. This
innovation should have considerable purchase when one considers how the reputational
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constraint and liability threats were insufficient to deter widespread ineffective
gatekeeping during the late 1990s and early 2000s. We have learned in recent decades
that positive incentives may be more likely than negative threats to promote desired
behavior. That insight can and should be adapted to promote effective capital market
gatekeeping. The examples provided in this Article of how to redesign contractual cash
flows and deploy professional teams, as well as increase public recognition for
gatekeeping success, are intended to advance that discussion.
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